Author: SAT Report
Publication: South Asia Tribune
Date: June 29-July 5, 2003
URL: http://www.satribune.com/archives/jun29_jul05_03/P1_sindhis.htmThree Sindhi organizations in US held a joint protest rally and news conference at the National Press Center in Washington against treatment of Sindhis by the military Government of General Pervez Musharraf.
Scores of people carrying many placards marched around the McPherson Square, close to the White House carrying placards and banners. After several rounds of walks around the square, the demonstrators gathered to hear speakers who denounced the Greater Thal Canal and demanded that the Pakistan government should cancel this project immediately.
Earlier protestors arrived at the NPC wearing traditional folk Sindhi topis and dresses, a scene quite uncommon in NPC. The press conference hall was full with many standing at the back and outside in the hall area.
Speaking first Zahid Makhdoom from WSI, spoke about what Sindh and Sindhis were facing at the hands of non-representative and dictatorial regime in Pakistan. In particular, he elaborated on the dreadful project called the Greater Thal Canal (GTC) and what it is going do to Sindh.
Dr. Inye Gorfeke from "Doctors Against Torture" organization, who visited Pakistan in 1989 to investigate the cases of official torture, said the security forces in Pakistan and other such countries predominantly torture two groups. The first group generally consists of people who struggle for democratic, economic and cultural rights and the other group is that of criminals, who are subjected to torture to extract confessions.
He said according to a recent US State Department study, three forms of torture are currently common in Pakistan. These are "beatings", "electric shock", and "denying food and drinks" to victims. He urged the people of Pakistan to provide help to heal the mental and physical abuses of these torture victims in their communities.
Dr. Saghir Shaikh from WSC condemned General Musharraf and his dictatorial regime and past rulers for their help in increasing the domination of Sindhis by other ethnic groups. He stated that economic conditions in Sindh, particularly, in rural areas, were fast deteriorating.
Aziz Narejo from SANA lamented how "totalitarian" and "unitary" systems imposed by the military had destroyed the democratic and judicial institutions in Pakistan.
He was very critical of the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence ISI) agency, which he said does not answer to any civilian authority and has been instrumental in carrying out the plots to harm the interests of smaller provinces of Pakistan. The ISI engages in proxy wars.
He added that some reports in the western media have concluded that the terrorist attack of 9/ 11 may have been a manifestation of such proxy wars. The agency has now positioned them in way that allows them to blackmail America and secure their support for dreadful conspiracies against smaller provinces.
In the 30-minute Q&A session the following key points were made:
1. The hegemony of military in Pakistan is the root cause of many of the problems faced by Pakistan in general and Sindhis in particular.
2. A loose co-federation of the Pakistani provinces offers the best alternative for restoring peace, justice, and fairness in Pakistan.
3. The three Sindhi organizations (SANA, WSC, and WSI) must expand their cooperation further and must continue to jointly sponsor other events.
4. Sindhis must not under-estimate the power of torture that would be unleashed against them as they come out in streets to protest the economic apartheid policies.
5. The US government holds a lot of clout and influence over the Pakistan government which should be used to pursue the Pakistani government to end the economic apartheid and restore full democracy.
6. The World Bank and IMF organizations should include conditions in their agreements that require the Pakistan government to shift resources from wasteful military to the civilian sectors.
7. Sindhis should approach private sector in USA and other developed countries to invest in Sindh.
8. Re-organization of Pakistani military by reducing its size and making sure that it becomes a representative organization of all provinces.
Speaking at the rally, Sani Panhwar, the current President of Sindhi Association of North America (SANA) was sure that Pakistan and US governments will hear the message and hoped that the three Sindhi organizations (SANA, WSC, and WSI) would continue to work together and will not rest until the rights of Sindhis were restored.
He said that Sindhis of Los Angeles will organize another protest and vigil on June 27 to drive the point once again that Greater Thal Canal was not acceptable to Sindhis.
Rev. Cleveland Sparrow, who is a member of DC Mayor's interfaith council, was happy to have met so many wonderful and peaceful Sindhis. He admired the values of Sindhis that encourage respect, tolerance, and justice for all. He said that the problems of Sindhis in a way similar to those faced by the citizens of DC. They continue to pay taxes but have no representation in their central decision making institutions. He was confident that soon both the people of DC and Sindh would have a full say in all major decisions that affect their lives.
Dr. Walter Landry, Director of "Think-Tank for National Self-determination" (TNS) spoke about the economic, human, political, and cultural rights of indigenous people in various parts of the world. He added the right of self-determination is an inalienable right of all people. He was saddened to know that the great people of Sindh who have always welcomed others and shared what ever they had with immigrant communities were now on the verge of losing of their identity and their water rights. He urged President Bush to ask General Musharraf to accept the demands of people of Sindh.
Dodo Mehri, a leader of the Sindh National Council (SNC), speaking in in Sindhi language traced the history of the water issue between Sindh and Punjab that has originated from the days when the British ruled India. He cited a trail of broken promises and violations that Punjab had committed to misuse the canals that were previously built only to y be used in the times of flood.
He added that the central government spent millions of dollars that were provided to it in the form of loans and grants by the World Bank and IMF after Pakistan and India signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. He said that the root cause for building the Greater Thal Canal is that the military officials are being allotted more and more land in the non-cultivable areas. This gives incentive to the military government to conspire to divert more water to irrigate their lands at the expense of the poor people of Sindhi.
Munawar Laghari, the key organizer of the events thanked every one who had made this day a historic day for the North American Sindhis. He expressed gratitude to the leaders of SANA, WSC and other non-affiliated volunteers who participated and helped in various ways.
He promised that he would do his very best to nourish the spirit of the Sindhi unity that has been achieved on the North American scene. He hoped that following this example, Sindhis, all over the world would unite to overcome the economic, cultural, and political threats that are faced by Sindh and Sindhis today.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
A summary of the history Of Sindh until 1947
BC 6000 : Indus Valley - Neolithic settlements.
BC 5000 : Farming, pottery and beads developed.
BC 4000 : Potter’s wheel and bow drill invented.
BC 3500 : Growth of pottery.
BC 3000 : Amri civilization and its ruins.
BC 3100-850 : Sindhi language evolved over a period of 2400 years.
BC 2500 : Kani Kot ruins - civilization .
BC 2300 : Mohen-jo-daro civilization .
BC 1500 : Sehwan (Sivistan) was important center of Shiva cult.
BC 810 : Egyptian Emperor Sume Rames attacked Sindh.
BC 566-490 : Huns ruled Sindh.
BC 519 : Sindh annexed to Persian Achaemenian Empire ruled by King Darius for about 125 years.
BC 326-325 : Alexander the "Great" stormed through the Indus Valley, met resistance in Sindh and was injured in Multan.
BC 313 : Buddhism was popularised in Sindh during emperor Ashoka’s period.
AD 280-500 : Persian rule.
AD 550-711 : i) Rai Sahiras and his son Rai Sahasi ruled Sindh and formed Rai Dynasty. (ii) Chach succeeded the Rai and founded Brahman Dynasty. (iii) Raja Dahar (Chach’s son) took over from Chander (Chach’s brother). Raja Dahar ruled Sindh for several years until the invasion of Arabs, when he was martyred.
AD 711-1026 : Sindh was invaded by a 17-year old Arab General, Muhammad Bin Qasim, establishing the Arab rule for next 305 years.
AD 1026-1350 : Soomro Dynasty ruled Sindh for 300 years.
AD 1054 : Soomras faced ruinous invasion by Mahmood Ghaznavi and Allauddin Khilji.
AD 1351 : The rise of the Samma Dynasty in Sindh. "Jams of Lasbella or currently known as the Alianis".
AD 1521-1554 : Arghun Rule was established in Sindh by Shah Beg. He was a descendant of Changez Khan.
AD 1554-1591 : General Mirza Isa Beg found Tarkhan Dynasty in Sindh (Turks in origin) after the death of Shah Hassan Arghun.
AD 1555 : Portuguese sacked Thatta, a bustling metropolis of Sindh.
AD 1591-1700 : Shanshah Akbar, the Ruler of Hindustan, annexed Sindh, and ruled Sindh by appointing his governors. (40 Governors were appointed during the 81 years of rule.).
AD 1701-1782 : Kalhoras ruled Sindh for 85 years. Twelve Kalhora rulers ruled during this time. This period is known as the golden period of Sindhi literature. Poets like Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Sachal Sarmast, and Sami are among the prominent poets of Sindh.
AD 1782-1843 : Talpurs ruled Sindh for 61 years. The country was divided into three states - Hyderabad State, Khairpur State and the State of Mirpur Khas.
AD 1843 : Talpur rulers of Sindh and Baluchistan were defeated by the British under Sir Charles Napier.
AD 1847 : Sindh was made part of Bombay Presidency by the British.
AD 1851 : Sindhi language was declared official language of Sindh.
AD 1853 : Final and refined version of Sindhi script was adopted by the British throughout Sindh and Bombay, which still exist in Sindh today.
AD 1908 : Barrister Ghulam M. Bhurgri and Harchandrai Vishindas demanded independence of Sindh from Bombay.
AD 1936 : Sindh regained independence from Bombay Presidency.
AD 1947 : India achieved independence from British rule after a long struggle and great sacrifices. Sindh became part of newly created Islamic State of Pakistan. Riots and violence erupted in Sindh. A massive exodus of Hindu Sindhis resulted. More than 1.1 million Sindhis migrated to India.
Sindh was ruled by the following dynasties after the Arab invasion :
The Sumra Dynasty (750 [1026?] - 1350 A.D.)
The Samma Dynasty (1351 - 1521 A.D.)
The Arghun Dynasty (1521 - 1554 A.D.)
The Turkhan Dynasty (1555 - 1608 A.D.)
The Moghul Dynasty (1608 - 1701 A.D.)
The Kalhora Dynasty (1701 - 1783 A.D.)
The Talpur Dynasty (1783 - 1843 A.D.)
The British Rule (1843 - 1947 A.D.)
The Pakistani Rule (1947 A.D. - ?)
BC 5000 : Farming, pottery and beads developed.
BC 4000 : Potter’s wheel and bow drill invented.
BC 3500 : Growth of pottery.
BC 3000 : Amri civilization and its ruins.
BC 3100-850 : Sindhi language evolved over a period of 2400 years.
BC 2500 : Kani Kot ruins - civilization .
BC 2300 : Mohen-jo-daro civilization .
BC 1500 : Sehwan (Sivistan) was important center of Shiva cult.
BC 810 : Egyptian Emperor Sume Rames attacked Sindh.
BC 566-490 : Huns ruled Sindh.
BC 519 : Sindh annexed to Persian Achaemenian Empire ruled by King Darius for about 125 years.
BC 326-325 : Alexander the "Great" stormed through the Indus Valley, met resistance in Sindh and was injured in Multan.
BC 313 : Buddhism was popularised in Sindh during emperor Ashoka’s period.
AD 280-500 : Persian rule.
AD 550-711 : i) Rai Sahiras and his son Rai Sahasi ruled Sindh and formed Rai Dynasty. (ii) Chach succeeded the Rai and founded Brahman Dynasty. (iii) Raja Dahar (Chach’s son) took over from Chander (Chach’s brother). Raja Dahar ruled Sindh for several years until the invasion of Arabs, when he was martyred.
AD 711-1026 : Sindh was invaded by a 17-year old Arab General, Muhammad Bin Qasim, establishing the Arab rule for next 305 years.
AD 1026-1350 : Soomro Dynasty ruled Sindh for 300 years.
AD 1054 : Soomras faced ruinous invasion by Mahmood Ghaznavi and Allauddin Khilji.
AD 1351 : The rise of the Samma Dynasty in Sindh. "Jams of Lasbella or currently known as the Alianis".
AD 1521-1554 : Arghun Rule was established in Sindh by Shah Beg. He was a descendant of Changez Khan.
AD 1554-1591 : General Mirza Isa Beg found Tarkhan Dynasty in Sindh (Turks in origin) after the death of Shah Hassan Arghun.
AD 1555 : Portuguese sacked Thatta, a bustling metropolis of Sindh.
AD 1591-1700 : Shanshah Akbar, the Ruler of Hindustan, annexed Sindh, and ruled Sindh by appointing his governors. (40 Governors were appointed during the 81 years of rule.).
AD 1701-1782 : Kalhoras ruled Sindh for 85 years. Twelve Kalhora rulers ruled during this time. This period is known as the golden period of Sindhi literature. Poets like Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Sachal Sarmast, and Sami are among the prominent poets of Sindh.
AD 1782-1843 : Talpurs ruled Sindh for 61 years. The country was divided into three states - Hyderabad State, Khairpur State and the State of Mirpur Khas.
AD 1843 : Talpur rulers of Sindh and Baluchistan were defeated by the British under Sir Charles Napier.
AD 1847 : Sindh was made part of Bombay Presidency by the British.
AD 1851 : Sindhi language was declared official language of Sindh.
AD 1853 : Final and refined version of Sindhi script was adopted by the British throughout Sindh and Bombay, which still exist in Sindh today.
AD 1908 : Barrister Ghulam M. Bhurgri and Harchandrai Vishindas demanded independence of Sindh from Bombay.
AD 1936 : Sindh regained independence from Bombay Presidency.
AD 1947 : India achieved independence from British rule after a long struggle and great sacrifices. Sindh became part of newly created Islamic State of Pakistan. Riots and violence erupted in Sindh. A massive exodus of Hindu Sindhis resulted. More than 1.1 million Sindhis migrated to India.
Sindh was ruled by the following dynasties after the Arab invasion :
The Sumra Dynasty (750 [1026?] - 1350 A.D.)
The Samma Dynasty (1351 - 1521 A.D.)
The Arghun Dynasty (1521 - 1554 A.D.)
The Turkhan Dynasty (1555 - 1608 A.D.)
The Moghul Dynasty (1608 - 1701 A.D.)
The Kalhora Dynasty (1701 - 1783 A.D.)
The Talpur Dynasty (1783 - 1843 A.D.)
The British Rule (1843 - 1947 A.D.)
The Pakistani Rule (1947 A.D. - ?)
Saturday, November 28, 2009
Sindh to raise rangers force, assembly told
KARACHI, Feb 3: As the members of the Sindh Assembly discussed law and order in the city — focussing more on desirability than on ground realities — one man was killed and three others injured in a terrorist attack on Monday. The legislators, however, failed to come up with specific proposals to tackle the issue of terrorism.
The proceedings were also marred by the disruptive tribal feud between the Mahars and the Jatois, election-related killings in the province, the government’s failure to provide security to the common man and the police excesses.
The provincial home minister expressed the resolve of raising a force of the Rangers in Sindh quite in the style it had existed in the pre-One-Unit days.
Members belonging to the opposition Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal crossed swords with those of the ruling Muttahida Qaumi Movement accusing them of employing strong-arm tactics during the by-elections.
Friction among members of the ruling coalition became evident as some lawmakers took a dim view of the remarks made by a Muttahida Quami Movement legislator about illegal trafficking in arms and drugs from the Frontier.
The treasury benches sought refuge in semantics and generalized assurances, saying that “all good proposals coming from the opposition in this regard will be given due consideration and implemented”.
However, this could not prevent the opposition from mounting a frontal attack on the government.
The Sindh chief minister, Sardar Ali Mohammad Mahar, finally broke his vow of silence and said that the life and property of the people of Sindh would be protected and law and order would remain a top priority of his government.
“If there is no peace in the province, no investment will come here,” the chief minister said, adding that “we have to control the flight of investment and investors from here”.
He, however, asked for some time to settle down.
Referring to car-lifting, the chief minister spoke about a plan aimed at setting up a border security force which “would not only combat crime but would also provide job opportunities to a large number of people”.
Referring to tribal feuds, Mr Mahar said that no one in Sindh wanted such confrontations. He said some illiterate people were responsible for such conflicts.
The chief minister said that the feud between the Mahars and the Jatois would be resolved by a Jirga on Feb 6 and Feb 7.
About the cases of kidnapping for ransom, Mr Mahar said that they must stop, adding that stringent measures had been taken to check them. He said that he had also talked to the Balochistan government about the issue. He said that if in a case of kidnapping for ransom, involvement of police officials was proved, their services would be terminated.
He announced that children of 100 police officials killed in the line of duty would be recruited as ASIs while the government would bear the educational expenses of others.
He said that in order to improve the police system, the federal government had been approached. He added that under a proposal the investigation wing of the police force would be brought under a district police officer on an experimental basis for two months in the districts of Sanghar and Shikarpur. He said if it worked well, the formula would be introduced in other districts as well.
About the presence of the Rangers in Sindh, Mr Mahar said that the paramilitary force was required because the police did not have the proper capability to combat terrorists.
Earlier, winding up the debate, Home Minister Syed Sardar Ahmed proposed that under the reformed police structure the SHO should be made more accountable. He noted that law and order had also deteriorated in the province because of the interference of the Centre.
He said that unless the new system was properly implemented through amendments, law and order would remain bad.
He said that the strength of the police force was not enough to deal with the menace of terrorism. That was why, he concluded, the Rangers and other forces were needed in the province.
He said: “We don’t want the Rangers. We will raise our own Rangers force the way we had in the pre-One Unit days.” He said that the border security force, planned by the chief minister, was a step in that direction.
In a way it was the opposition’s day which put the government in a spot about the question of resolving tribal conflicts by a jirga. It also criticized the government for failing to curb the rising incidence of suicides and expressed concern over the killing of activists during the by-elections.
The leader of the opposition, Nisar Khuhro, said Sindh was facing these problems because the previous government had denied the people of the province their right to govern themselves after Hakim Said’s murder.
Mr Khuhro said that the convoy system on the highways, rising incidence of suicides and unemployment showed how insecure people were. He said that if the government which had introduced ordinances banning chanda had been sincere in tackling the issue of law and order, it could have promulgated some ordinances to amend the existing police laws.
He was critical of the increase in tribal feuds and called for resolving them through a jirga. “It is an attempt to circumvent the rule of law and make the police redundant,” he said.
He also criticized the government for turning a blind eye to the show of fire-arms by the caravan of provincial ministers during the by-elections.
The tirade was initiated by Syed Qaim Ali Shah who had focussed his argument on the tribal conflict involving the Mahars and the Jatois and the killing of three PPP supporters during the by-elections in Khairpur-Nawabshah area.
He said: “When two people are killed in the city, the chief minister and others visit the bereaved families but not a word was uttered by them when three PPP supporters were killed in the interior of Sindh.”
Faisal Sabzwari of the Muttahida Quami Movement, while responding to the contentions of Humaira Alwani, Tariq Masood and others, appealed for reconciling the differences and called for local policing.
He wondered why the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, which was in power in the Frontier, had failed to stop illegal arms from filtering into Sindh from Darra, Peshawar and other places. Thereupon, amid great uproar, Hamidullah of the Muttahida Majlis- i-Amal raised his objection, alleging that recently a MQM activist had been arrested with fire-arms.
This also drew an angry response from the education minister, Irfanullah Marwat, who said that Peshawar was also a part of Pakistan.
The proceedings were also marred by the disruptive tribal feud between the Mahars and the Jatois, election-related killings in the province, the government’s failure to provide security to the common man and the police excesses.
The provincial home minister expressed the resolve of raising a force of the Rangers in Sindh quite in the style it had existed in the pre-One-Unit days.
Members belonging to the opposition Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal crossed swords with those of the ruling Muttahida Qaumi Movement accusing them of employing strong-arm tactics during the by-elections.
Friction among members of the ruling coalition became evident as some lawmakers took a dim view of the remarks made by a Muttahida Quami Movement legislator about illegal trafficking in arms and drugs from the Frontier.
The treasury benches sought refuge in semantics and generalized assurances, saying that “all good proposals coming from the opposition in this regard will be given due consideration and implemented”.
However, this could not prevent the opposition from mounting a frontal attack on the government.
The Sindh chief minister, Sardar Ali Mohammad Mahar, finally broke his vow of silence and said that the life and property of the people of Sindh would be protected and law and order would remain a top priority of his government.
“If there is no peace in the province, no investment will come here,” the chief minister said, adding that “we have to control the flight of investment and investors from here”.
He, however, asked for some time to settle down.
Referring to car-lifting, the chief minister spoke about a plan aimed at setting up a border security force which “would not only combat crime but would also provide job opportunities to a large number of people”.
Referring to tribal feuds, Mr Mahar said that no one in Sindh wanted such confrontations. He said some illiterate people were responsible for such conflicts.
The chief minister said that the feud between the Mahars and the Jatois would be resolved by a Jirga on Feb 6 and Feb 7.
About the cases of kidnapping for ransom, Mr Mahar said that they must stop, adding that stringent measures had been taken to check them. He said that he had also talked to the Balochistan government about the issue. He said that if in a case of kidnapping for ransom, involvement of police officials was proved, their services would be terminated.
He announced that children of 100 police officials killed in the line of duty would be recruited as ASIs while the government would bear the educational expenses of others.
He said that in order to improve the police system, the federal government had been approached. He added that under a proposal the investigation wing of the police force would be brought under a district police officer on an experimental basis for two months in the districts of Sanghar and Shikarpur. He said if it worked well, the formula would be introduced in other districts as well.
About the presence of the Rangers in Sindh, Mr Mahar said that the paramilitary force was required because the police did not have the proper capability to combat terrorists.
Earlier, winding up the debate, Home Minister Syed Sardar Ahmed proposed that under the reformed police structure the SHO should be made more accountable. He noted that law and order had also deteriorated in the province because of the interference of the Centre.
He said that unless the new system was properly implemented through amendments, law and order would remain bad.
He said that the strength of the police force was not enough to deal with the menace of terrorism. That was why, he concluded, the Rangers and other forces were needed in the province.
He said: “We don’t want the Rangers. We will raise our own Rangers force the way we had in the pre-One Unit days.” He said that the border security force, planned by the chief minister, was a step in that direction.
In a way it was the opposition’s day which put the government in a spot about the question of resolving tribal conflicts by a jirga. It also criticized the government for failing to curb the rising incidence of suicides and expressed concern over the killing of activists during the by-elections.
The leader of the opposition, Nisar Khuhro, said Sindh was facing these problems because the previous government had denied the people of the province their right to govern themselves after Hakim Said’s murder.
Mr Khuhro said that the convoy system on the highways, rising incidence of suicides and unemployment showed how insecure people were. He said that if the government which had introduced ordinances banning chanda had been sincere in tackling the issue of law and order, it could have promulgated some ordinances to amend the existing police laws.
He was critical of the increase in tribal feuds and called for resolving them through a jirga. “It is an attempt to circumvent the rule of law and make the police redundant,” he said.
He also criticized the government for turning a blind eye to the show of fire-arms by the caravan of provincial ministers during the by-elections.
The tirade was initiated by Syed Qaim Ali Shah who had focussed his argument on the tribal conflict involving the Mahars and the Jatois and the killing of three PPP supporters during the by-elections in Khairpur-Nawabshah area.
He said: “When two people are killed in the city, the chief minister and others visit the bereaved families but not a word was uttered by them when three PPP supporters were killed in the interior of Sindh.”
Faisal Sabzwari of the Muttahida Quami Movement, while responding to the contentions of Humaira Alwani, Tariq Masood and others, appealed for reconciling the differences and called for local policing.
He wondered why the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, which was in power in the Frontier, had failed to stop illegal arms from filtering into Sindh from Darra, Peshawar and other places. Thereupon, amid great uproar, Hamidullah of the Muttahida Majlis- i-Amal raised his objection, alleging that recently a MQM activist had been arrested with fire-arms.
This also drew an angry response from the education minister, Irfanullah Marwat, who said that Peshawar was also a part of Pakistan.
Conflict between Sindh and Punjab Is it real or unreal?
Fuss between Punjab and Sindh! Is it natural, or exploitation?
I have found some amazing similarities between Punjab and Sindh, where I shocked to see that
majority of our regional activists are aloof from these facts. Here I am trying to show some of these:
>>Indus Valley Civilization (IVC) contains Sindh & Punjab, … the Moen-jo-Daro & Harappa are vital proofs.
»In history, there were Great India and Persia, which had large scope of sovereignty. The Baluchistan was buffer state between Persia and India.
»There is a Natural boundary between Sindh & Baluchistan to keep them safe and protect from each other, the same is not with Punjab and Sindh. There is no any natural boundary between Punjab and the Sindh. More over for the better understanding to the culture and language both have one mixed race nation called Siraiki. This nation is working natural way of exchanging the parameters of Sindh as well as Punjab.
»Sindh & Punjab have same agriculture based economy; this base is not with Baluchistan.
»Before the Islam, Sindhis and Punjabis both were religiously Hindus, but when we look in Baluchs, they were Kurd mixed old dogma believers.
»The linguistic grammar and rhythm of Sindhi & Punjabi are same because both languages born from ancient Sanskrit. Baluchi language came from Persian accent.
»The folk music or literature of Punjab and Sindh is very same in against of Baluchistan which is totally different. Their musical instrument and note of ragas are totally different than Punjab or Sindh.
» The philosophical approach & psyche of Sindh and Punjab was (and is) same rather than Baluchistan. Both had vast inspired Vedanti Mysticism (Sufism). Shah Lateef, Sachal Sarmast Bullah Shah, Fareed, Waris Shah Mehr Ali are lively legends of the philosophy from both states.
»In past, there are multiple proofs that Sindh and Baluchistan fought on interests and lost thousands people from both sides in different wars, but there is no any tiny proof has been found that Punjab fought with Sindh on any issue.
» In Sindhi Society, the extremist acts like Karo Kari , robbery, theft psyche, murders etc are well gifted by Baluchistan, such sort of crimes are linked together between the inner Baluchistan even up to the now a days too. According to the geography if we classified the Sindh in to two parts then we are finding following sub regions:»
1.Right Bank of Indus: As agricultural issues this bank is not well furnished and rich as comparison with other bank. Mostly Balochs occupied in this bank, that’s why the bank is topmost nest of criminals. They even smuggle currency, involved in human trafficking, kidnapping and harassing the other communities. Overall if we overview on this bank then we would find the majority of Baluchistan based headmen, those are ruling over the conflicts of tribal issues, they make daily new issues for the murders of innocent people on the issue of tribal wars.
2.Left Bank of Indus: This bank of Indus has good agricultural lands and almost peaceful atmosphere. The ruling headmen belonging with old Sindhi castes. The Baluchi influence is not much here, that’s why they live in peace and harmony. Today the history witness that most classical poets belong with this bank, who taught to live in peace and love.
»The Punjabi settlers who came in Sindh since 1940 (mostly Punjabi came here before 40’s) had started the cultivating agriculture and shown their keen hard work with the land. Today they have built villages, live in peace and prosperity in the Sindh. They don’t involve in criminal practices, they have given their daughters to local Sindhis for marriages. And the other hands Baluchis have really made hell regarding in the peace and to maintaining law & order situations. They shown their own psyche in criminal activities. Today Baluchis people are not wealth handed labors as comparison with Punjabi settlers.
»In aspects of refuges race, Baluchis & Punjabis are both migrated nations who came here for the interests regarding with their betterment of lives. Punjabis started their own profession as farming lands and Baluchis had shown their own. They spread criminal activities and on the shoulders of black wealth they became headmen, politicians and achieved multiple trades. Today they are more than 70% holding local politics up to the higher level seats of assemblies, where from they are acting their best sincerity with the Sindh and local settlers. Irony is that they are largely headmen of national politics in the Sindh. Syeds are second top numbered politicians of Sindh. Amazing is that they are also refugee.
»Today the Sindhi language is a lively language and according to the UNISCO report about the languages the Sindhi language is totally safe and will survive with vigor capacity in even next century as Punjabi too. But the Baluchi language and its accent are in red zone. Today near about 26 accents of Baluchi language are died due to showing least efforts to save the language by their speakers.
»The history of conflict between Sindh & Punjab is not much old but after the partition of Indo-Pak. In the partition Sindhis have faced enormous difficulties and withdrawn its middle class in shape of Hindus who had migrated from Sindh. The second effect was fallen on Punjab who lost its left arm (East Punjab). But no any sign is visible in which we can see that Baluchistan had lost any identity or economical downfall in the partition.
»It’s the very touchy sense in grief of Sindhi labor, but its fact; that Punjabis had taught the new ways of agro-technology and market concern environment to the Sindhis, but its very invisible any proof that Baluchis have given any expertise to local Sindhis except short cut methodologies, trickery ways to success wealth.
»Today if Sindhis are well elaborated in every field of life then there is partly pushes of Punjab; otherwise on the shoulders of Baluchis, Sindhi might be in the age of tribal system.
Hence the question comes in our mind that in old times Punjab and Sindh had passed really golden age, then when and where from their fuss started?
I’ve found some amazing reasons that:
*The history of current conflicts is not too old than 70 years before. It started from when Sindh separated from Bombay in 1936.
*Sindh has get rid of Mulla but Punjab has been pulling up the Mullas, due to its 2 nation theory.
*Sindh has aliened Germany forces in 2nd World War in the shape of 3rd Hur Movement, but Punjab had totally aside with alliance forces with British Army. And when Britain announced the Pakistan and India as free countries, they went and given gift the whole Pakistan to Punjab. And the issue arose from the starting day.
*The riot or conflicts between Sindh and Punjab are not natural but the self made from some politicians who never want to make a peaceful atmosphere here. Those politicians can be classified in following cadres:
1.US Foreign Policy Makers.
2.Punjab Opportunists.
3.Some greedy Sindhi Nationalists leaders.
May be I am wrong but here I have shared , what ever I’ve found!
Village Assembly (Goth) in Sindh, Pakistan
Abstract
This paper reflects on the concept, functionality and roles of the village assemblies in the
Sukkur and Khairpur districts of Sindh, Pakistan, under the newly introduced devolved
governance system of the government of Pakistan. It covers the background of local
institutions and the traditions of collective wisdom and action in various parts of
Pakistan, and makes comparisons between new and previous approaches of collective
action. It provides a rationale for the transformation of new institutions as a result of
loopholes and lacunae in the traditional systems. The government and several
international agencies have been making efforts in Pakistan to ensure the participation of
local people in the development process. The author has focused on efforts made by
Leadership for Environment And Development (LEAD)-Pakistan, under the project
Democratized Education Management and Ownership (DEMO), to involve the local
people in educational management through village assemblies. The role and functions of
village assemblies in accessing quality education with the participation and involvement
of the local people is the subject of the study
2
Introduction
The Government of Pakistan has introduced a devolved local government system for
involving the people in the planning and implementation of development initiatives at the
grassroots level, through a well-conceived devolution of powers plan. The education
sector, long ignored by beneficiaries, has become the topmost priority for the government
and other actors under the devolution plan as a key to the socio-economic uplift of the
masses. How to ensure access to quality education in the context of the devolved system
of local governments in Pakistan has been a challenge for governmental and nongovernmental
agencies (NGOs). The US Agency for International Development (USAID)
through the Education Sector Reforms Assistance (ESRA) has been supporting the
initiatives for access to quality education in Pakistan through various governmental and
non-governmental actors. LEAD–Pakistan (LP) is a member of the global LEAD family
and network of people from various sectors like the government, NGOs, academia and
media. LEAD – Pakistan is a partner in the implementation of the ‘Democratized
Education Management and Ownership’ (DEMO) project in Sindh. LEAD realized the
need to transform traditional institutions like Goth Kath into modern democratic forums
like Goth Kechery (Village Assembly) that could respond to the emerging needs of
society concerning the developmental aspects, as well as the socio-economic uplift of the
common people. Another reason for this transformation is based on the fact that the
traditional forums have lost recognition and acceptance by bureaucracy, feudalists and
the educated elite at the local level. Therefore, stakeholders and partners appreciated the
concept and philosophy of these new institutions that are formatted on the basis of the
principles of democracy. The concept of VA is based upon traditional collectivism with
space for marginalized segments and gender, which can further be revitalized, sensitized
and improved to assume ownership of the services of development initiatives in the social
sector (e.g. health and education) and enable the local communities to contribute towards
the sustainability of the initiatives.
The background of Collectivism
The tradition of collective wisdom and action is as old as human history, but the concept
of collectivism has changed with economic needs, social setups and geographic
conditions. In ancient tribal and agro-pastoral societies, self-defense and joint attacks on
enemies were the common factors that brought people of a particular area, tribe or
watershed together. Custom dictates that people get together as a group for the cause of
the common good, and to make collective efforts to resolve the issues that affect their
lives. The tradition of collective decision-making has been transformed into modern
democratic institutions in the civilized world. In Pakistan, collectivism is a centuries old
tradition. This tradition has different names, functions and institutional setups—jirga in
the Pushtoon culture. In a jirga all the tribes are given equal representation through their
elders, locally called maliks (tribal chieftains) wherein the decisions are always made by
a majority vote. In the tribal belt of Pakistan, the tribes still elect the maliks as their
representatives for the National Assembly and senate with a limited right to vote. In
Sindh, the issues are resolved in a kachery or Goth Kath (Village Assembly) where issues
are resolved by the selected heads of tribes involved in the issues. The decision-making
3
part of the kachery is still known as jirga in Sindh. In Punjab, Punchayat, with a
mandate of reconciliation, is a form of collective decision-making with representation
from communities on a selective basis. In Northern Pakistan, the Zaitu system—
community-based management of local issues on fixed terms and task-to-task basis is
prevalent. The local forums are linked by culture, religious belief systems and traditions
in the area where they operate. For example, in Muslim societies, the mosque is preferred
as a central place to hold such forums but in pluralistic societies, other places are chosen
for the maximum participation of various groups.
Apart from the common agenda of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘arbitration’, another common
factor among all the traditional and local systems is their powerlessness and
remorselessness in terms of money and legal authority in assuming these agenda. In some
cases, these institutions have no legal recognization or authority, since provinicial
governments and the state’s legal agencies are already and simultaneously, in operation.
All the successive governments in Pakistan have been dreaming about the
decentralization of power to the grassroots level. Historically, the British rulers used the
local institutions for their own interests since the arrival of the East India Company. As
The Fifth Report, by Charles Metcalfe for the Select Committee of the House of
Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company, in 1830, reads:
The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they want
within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to
last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution
succeeds to revolution; Hindoo, Patan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sik, English are all
masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same... If a country
remains for a series of years the scene of continued pillage and massacre, so that
villages cannot be inhabited, the scattered villagers nevertheless return whenever
the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away, but the
succeeding generation will return. The sons will take the place of their fathers; the
same site for the village, the same position for the houses, the same lands, will be
occupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was
depopulated...
The need for new democratic forums
In a traditional tribal setup the common man is never directly involved in decisionmaking.
The marginalized segments and common people, especially women, are kept out
of the power circles to ensure the ultimate authority of a few people who rule the whole
society. Traditionally, Sindhi society is agrarian, with all its characteristics still visible in
rural areas. Usually the landlords and tribal chieftains have the ultimate authority and
make decisions on behalf of their followers. As a result, the marginalized segments,
especially women, have a limited role or no role at all in traditional forums. The
traditional Goth Kath usually has no timeframe for holding its session/meetings and was
always held when the need was felt, or when a conflict within the community or with
another community arose. It has also been observed that the traditional Kath has not been
involved in development issues and/or in making suggestions, in planning etc. Recently
there has been a feeling that the traditional Jirga system is instigating conflicts and is
4
involved in contradictory issues like honor killing or Karo kari (A form of honor killing).
Apart from the government’s efforts to ban all forms of honor killing inclusive of Karo
kari, there is a strong feeling among the educated liberal class against tribal conflict
resolution methods and approaches in Sindh. Some intellectuals have gone to the extent
of labeling the decisions made by jirgas in Sindh ‘tribal terrorism’ because of the
consequences of the decisions that lead to clashes and fatal combats among individuals,
families and tribes.
The Village Assembly (VA)
VA represents those who live in the village: members from village interest groups,
village residents, and fraternity members are all represented. The VA is a forum/platform
dealing with issues concerning school(s) and education in a particular area, and consists
of stakeholders, parents, notables (influential people with repute) in the periphery of
school(s), civil society institutions working in the area, government agencies, NGOs,
political leaders and social activists.
Objectives
The overall objective of a VA is to promote social intermediation and develop social
capital for the improvement of schools and the quality of education in the periphery.
However, the specific objectives of the VA are to:
●Provide a common platform/forum for participation of all the stakeholders in the
school(s) where they can discuss and resolve the issues in a shared effort.
●Foster the community’s collective efforts for the common good, especially for the
improvement of education in the area.
●Nurture, promote and develop community initiatives and institutions through a
collective approach and self-reliance base.
The VA Session
A VA can be called to resolve an issue or a series of issues concerning the
developmental, educational and social needs of the people living within the school
periphery. In other words, a VA is a forum of stakeholders and beneficiaries including all
the people living in the surroundings of a school or schools. The VA is called and
conducted by the people with the approval of the majority.
To conduct the VA session the following are considered to be prerequisites:
●A VA is always called or summoned by a respectable person, notables or office bearers
of the School Management Committee (SMC) or
●For a complete VA quorum, presence of the stakeholders (depending upon the size of
the population in different villages and vicinities) is a must. Usually the VAs are attended
by:
a. Parents (common people) of the periphery: at least one of the parents of at
least one student from each class in the school.
5
b. Schoolteachers: at least one, preferably the headmaster of the school
c. The SMC representative is authorized to attend.
d. NGOs (optional).
e. Government officials (optional).
●The VA keeps all its proceeding and records available for the public.
● The VA communicates with the government and other agencies through SMCs or
person(s) designated by the VA for the task.
Modus Operandi
When a VA is summoned, a requisition is sent to the major stakeholders and community
members for their participation, with an agenda to be discussed. Initially the VAs were
called by the SMCs and the participants decided the next date for a meeting during the
session and in case a date was not finalized, one or more than one persons were assigned
the task of summoning the VA. The VA participants usually set a code of conduct for its
meetings and a moderator or a facilitator maintains the order of the house. The code of
conduct outlines the general matters of code of ethics:
●All the participants respect the opinions of others and listen to each other.
●The facilitator encourages the participants in participating in the discussions.
●All the participants address the facilitator and not each other or the audience.
●Religious, tribal and ethnic matters are not discussed in the assembly.
●The participants raise hands to respond to a question.
●The decisions are made in a democratic manner on the principle of majority rule by a
show of hands.
●In the case of inconclusive findings, the issue is deferred to the next meeting or to a
committee constituted by the assembly for the purpose of coming up with an acceptable
solution.
●Female participants and elders are respected according to the Sindhi tradition.
The life cycle of the VA
The VA can be called for the discussion or the resolution of a specific issue or a number
of issues, In the case of DEMO, the VAs have been conducted for visioning and planning
of improved schools and for the provision of quality education in the villages. From the
inception to the formulation of a School Improvement Plan (SIP), the VAs are conducted
in series and each step defines the state of affairs or the progress of the task for which the
VAs are conducted.
6
VA 1 VA2 VA3…… ………VAx
(Visioning) (Planning) (Resource Mobilization)
(Monitoring)
(Figure 1)
Visioning
With the help of a trained activist, the community develops a common vision for an
improved school in the respective village by using different PRA tools. The visioning
exercise helps the villagers in thinking about the quality of education through a better
school environment. The key questions for visioning include, but are not limited to,
physical facilities in a school (rooms, furniture, playground and toilets etc), teachers and
other issues. The VA provides a common forum for teachers, parents and other key role
players in a village or school vicinity to share their concerns and thinking with each
other. During the first meeting the participants also identify and select capable people
(community members and/or teachers) to develop a formal plan for school improvement.
Planning
A formal SIP is presented in the second VA (VA2) wherein the community reviews the
plans jointly. Participants are encouraged to take part in the discussions and prioritize the
needs mentioned in the plan. For timely implementation of the plan, the tasks mentioned
in the plan are assigned to various community members in the presence of the
participants. Community contribution in the form of material, time and finances is
frequently observed in the VAs. Community members pledge their time, money and other
resources voluntarily to improve the conditions of the schools for quality education in the
villages.
Resource mobilization and utilization
Apart from community contributions during VAs, the community evolves a strategy for
resource mobilization according to the SIP. The available and committed resources are
discussed and allocated in the 3rd village assembly (VA3 in Figure 1). The
- Assessment
- Thinking
- Sharing of visions and concerns
- Identification of the right people to develop a plan
- Presentation of School Improvement Plan
- Discussions and amendments
- Prioritization of needs
- Action planning
- Fund securing,
- Resource mobilization
- Review of School Improvement Plan (SIP)
- Creating new institutions and strengthening existing ones
- Review of Progress of SIP implementation
- Reallocation of resources
7
implementation strategy is devised to effectively utilize the available resources. A
reporting and M&E mechanism with responsibilities is also devised to ensure
accountability.
Participatory Monitoring
The VA undertakes the monitoring of its sessions through a review of progress and an
assessment of future needs. Other stakeholders like donors, the Education Department
and facilitating NGOs can also take part in the sessions as part of the participatory
monitoring. During the session, participants ask critical questions and these are answered
in a democratic manner.
Impacts
In the absence of a working democracy, participation of the local people in the planning
and implementation of the development process has been a challenge for the
transparency, accountability and efficiency of the process. The VA experience has been
instrumental in ensuring the participation of people at the grassroots level.
Within a period of three to four months 1,061 VAs were conducted for the first time in
the area and the same number of assemblies for the second time in three tehsils (Khairpur
Mirs, Thari Mirwah and Kotdeji) of two districts (Sukkur and Khairpur). A total number
of more than 51,000 people participated in the visioning and planning of schools at the
grassroots level, including 1,900 women. Although the women’s participation was less
than that of the men, it was the first time that women were involved in the visioning and
planning of schools. During these hundred days the local communities developed more
than one thousand SIPs with a follow-up mechanism for monitoring implementation.
The way ahead
More than 6,000 VAs are planned under the DEMO project by the year 2006. In this way
communities will be facilitated in developing 3,000 SIPs, with the training of 15,000
community activists in various basic management skills to strengthen the community
initiatives at the grassroots level. Out of the 3,000 communities approximately 650 will
be assisted in the formation of Community Citizen Boards (CCBs) and registration under
the law. These CCBs will be legal entities and will also be eligible to access funds from
governmental and non-governmental sources.
Conclusion
If supported and encouraged, VAs have the potential to provide a breeding ground for the
nurturing of community-based institutions at the village level. On the one hand, VAs
have the potential to act as general bodies for the local institutions, and on the other, these
forums will ensure accountability and transparency in a democratic manner through the
ownership of initiatives.
8
References
Annual Project Document of Democratized Education Management and Ownership.
2004. Islamabad: LEAD- Pakistan. (Unpublished)
Annual World Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People. 2004.
Washington: The World Bank
Annual The Next Ascent. 2002. An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program,
Pakistan. Washington: The World Bank
Najam, Adil. 2000. The Four C’s of NGO-Government Relations. Islamabad: LEADPakistan
Websites:
Leadership for Environment And Development Pakistan.
Office of the Community Development Rural Development US Department of
Agriculture, Washington, DC.
Palas Valley Conservation and Development Project (PCDP)
National Rural Support Program.
This paper reflects on the concept, functionality and roles of the village assemblies in the
Sukkur and Khairpur districts of Sindh, Pakistan, under the newly introduced devolved
governance system of the government of Pakistan. It covers the background of local
institutions and the traditions of collective wisdom and action in various parts of
Pakistan, and makes comparisons between new and previous approaches of collective
action. It provides a rationale for the transformation of new institutions as a result of
loopholes and lacunae in the traditional systems. The government and several
international agencies have been making efforts in Pakistan to ensure the participation of
local people in the development process. The author has focused on efforts made by
Leadership for Environment And Development (LEAD)-Pakistan, under the project
Democratized Education Management and Ownership (DEMO), to involve the local
people in educational management through village assemblies. The role and functions of
village assemblies in accessing quality education with the participation and involvement
of the local people is the subject of the study
2
Introduction
The Government of Pakistan has introduced a devolved local government system for
involving the people in the planning and implementation of development initiatives at the
grassroots level, through a well-conceived devolution of powers plan. The education
sector, long ignored by beneficiaries, has become the topmost priority for the government
and other actors under the devolution plan as a key to the socio-economic uplift of the
masses. How to ensure access to quality education in the context of the devolved system
of local governments in Pakistan has been a challenge for governmental and nongovernmental
agencies (NGOs). The US Agency for International Development (USAID)
through the Education Sector Reforms Assistance (ESRA) has been supporting the
initiatives for access to quality education in Pakistan through various governmental and
non-governmental actors. LEAD–Pakistan (LP) is a member of the global LEAD family
and network of people from various sectors like the government, NGOs, academia and
media. LEAD – Pakistan is a partner in the implementation of the ‘Democratized
Education Management and Ownership’ (DEMO) project in Sindh. LEAD realized the
need to transform traditional institutions like Goth Kath into modern democratic forums
like Goth Kechery (Village Assembly) that could respond to the emerging needs of
society concerning the developmental aspects, as well as the socio-economic uplift of the
common people. Another reason for this transformation is based on the fact that the
traditional forums have lost recognition and acceptance by bureaucracy, feudalists and
the educated elite at the local level. Therefore, stakeholders and partners appreciated the
concept and philosophy of these new institutions that are formatted on the basis of the
principles of democracy. The concept of VA is based upon traditional collectivism with
space for marginalized segments and gender, which can further be revitalized, sensitized
and improved to assume ownership of the services of development initiatives in the social
sector (e.g. health and education) and enable the local communities to contribute towards
the sustainability of the initiatives.
The background of Collectivism
The tradition of collective wisdom and action is as old as human history, but the concept
of collectivism has changed with economic needs, social setups and geographic
conditions. In ancient tribal and agro-pastoral societies, self-defense and joint attacks on
enemies were the common factors that brought people of a particular area, tribe or
watershed together. Custom dictates that people get together as a group for the cause of
the common good, and to make collective efforts to resolve the issues that affect their
lives. The tradition of collective decision-making has been transformed into modern
democratic institutions in the civilized world. In Pakistan, collectivism is a centuries old
tradition. This tradition has different names, functions and institutional setups—jirga in
the Pushtoon culture. In a jirga all the tribes are given equal representation through their
elders, locally called maliks (tribal chieftains) wherein the decisions are always made by
a majority vote. In the tribal belt of Pakistan, the tribes still elect the maliks as their
representatives for the National Assembly and senate with a limited right to vote. In
Sindh, the issues are resolved in a kachery or Goth Kath (Village Assembly) where issues
are resolved by the selected heads of tribes involved in the issues. The decision-making
3
part of the kachery is still known as jirga in Sindh. In Punjab, Punchayat, with a
mandate of reconciliation, is a form of collective decision-making with representation
from communities on a selective basis. In Northern Pakistan, the Zaitu system—
community-based management of local issues on fixed terms and task-to-task basis is
prevalent. The local forums are linked by culture, religious belief systems and traditions
in the area where they operate. For example, in Muslim societies, the mosque is preferred
as a central place to hold such forums but in pluralistic societies, other places are chosen
for the maximum participation of various groups.
Apart from the common agenda of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘arbitration’, another common
factor among all the traditional and local systems is their powerlessness and
remorselessness in terms of money and legal authority in assuming these agenda. In some
cases, these institutions have no legal recognization or authority, since provinicial
governments and the state’s legal agencies are already and simultaneously, in operation.
All the successive governments in Pakistan have been dreaming about the
decentralization of power to the grassroots level. Historically, the British rulers used the
local institutions for their own interests since the arrival of the East India Company. As
The Fifth Report, by Charles Metcalfe for the Select Committee of the House of
Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company, in 1830, reads:
The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they want
within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to
last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution
succeeds to revolution; Hindoo, Patan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sik, English are all
masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same... If a country
remains for a series of years the scene of continued pillage and massacre, so that
villages cannot be inhabited, the scattered villagers nevertheless return whenever
the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away, but the
succeeding generation will return. The sons will take the place of their fathers; the
same site for the village, the same position for the houses, the same lands, will be
occupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was
depopulated...
The need for new democratic forums
In a traditional tribal setup the common man is never directly involved in decisionmaking.
The marginalized segments and common people, especially women, are kept out
of the power circles to ensure the ultimate authority of a few people who rule the whole
society. Traditionally, Sindhi society is agrarian, with all its characteristics still visible in
rural areas. Usually the landlords and tribal chieftains have the ultimate authority and
make decisions on behalf of their followers. As a result, the marginalized segments,
especially women, have a limited role or no role at all in traditional forums. The
traditional Goth Kath usually has no timeframe for holding its session/meetings and was
always held when the need was felt, or when a conflict within the community or with
another community arose. It has also been observed that the traditional Kath has not been
involved in development issues and/or in making suggestions, in planning etc. Recently
there has been a feeling that the traditional Jirga system is instigating conflicts and is
4
involved in contradictory issues like honor killing or Karo kari (A form of honor killing).
Apart from the government’s efforts to ban all forms of honor killing inclusive of Karo
kari, there is a strong feeling among the educated liberal class against tribal conflict
resolution methods and approaches in Sindh. Some intellectuals have gone to the extent
of labeling the decisions made by jirgas in Sindh ‘tribal terrorism’ because of the
consequences of the decisions that lead to clashes and fatal combats among individuals,
families and tribes.
The Village Assembly (VA)
VA represents those who live in the village: members from village interest groups,
village residents, and fraternity members are all represented. The VA is a forum/platform
dealing with issues concerning school(s) and education in a particular area, and consists
of stakeholders, parents, notables (influential people with repute) in the periphery of
school(s), civil society institutions working in the area, government agencies, NGOs,
political leaders and social activists.
Objectives
The overall objective of a VA is to promote social intermediation and develop social
capital for the improvement of schools and the quality of education in the periphery.
However, the specific objectives of the VA are to:
●Provide a common platform/forum for participation of all the stakeholders in the
school(s) where they can discuss and resolve the issues in a shared effort.
●Foster the community’s collective efforts for the common good, especially for the
improvement of education in the area.
●Nurture, promote and develop community initiatives and institutions through a
collective approach and self-reliance base.
The VA Session
A VA can be called to resolve an issue or a series of issues concerning the
developmental, educational and social needs of the people living within the school
periphery. In other words, a VA is a forum of stakeholders and beneficiaries including all
the people living in the surroundings of a school or schools. The VA is called and
conducted by the people with the approval of the majority.
To conduct the VA session the following are considered to be prerequisites:
●A VA is always called or summoned by a respectable person, notables or office bearers
of the School Management Committee (SMC) or
●For a complete VA quorum, presence of the stakeholders (depending upon the size of
the population in different villages and vicinities) is a must. Usually the VAs are attended
by:
a. Parents (common people) of the periphery: at least one of the parents of at
least one student from each class in the school.
5
b. Schoolteachers: at least one, preferably the headmaster of the school
c. The SMC representative is authorized to attend.
d. NGOs (optional).
e. Government officials (optional).
●The VA keeps all its proceeding and records available for the public.
● The VA communicates with the government and other agencies through SMCs or
person(s) designated by the VA for the task.
Modus Operandi
When a VA is summoned, a requisition is sent to the major stakeholders and community
members for their participation, with an agenda to be discussed. Initially the VAs were
called by the SMCs and the participants decided the next date for a meeting during the
session and in case a date was not finalized, one or more than one persons were assigned
the task of summoning the VA. The VA participants usually set a code of conduct for its
meetings and a moderator or a facilitator maintains the order of the house. The code of
conduct outlines the general matters of code of ethics:
●All the participants respect the opinions of others and listen to each other.
●The facilitator encourages the participants in participating in the discussions.
●All the participants address the facilitator and not each other or the audience.
●Religious, tribal and ethnic matters are not discussed in the assembly.
●The participants raise hands to respond to a question.
●The decisions are made in a democratic manner on the principle of majority rule by a
show of hands.
●In the case of inconclusive findings, the issue is deferred to the next meeting or to a
committee constituted by the assembly for the purpose of coming up with an acceptable
solution.
●Female participants and elders are respected according to the Sindhi tradition.
The life cycle of the VA
The VA can be called for the discussion or the resolution of a specific issue or a number
of issues, In the case of DEMO, the VAs have been conducted for visioning and planning
of improved schools and for the provision of quality education in the villages. From the
inception to the formulation of a School Improvement Plan (SIP), the VAs are conducted
in series and each step defines the state of affairs or the progress of the task for which the
VAs are conducted.
6
VA 1 VA2 VA3…… ………VAx
(Visioning) (Planning) (Resource Mobilization)
(Monitoring)
(Figure 1)
Visioning
With the help of a trained activist, the community develops a common vision for an
improved school in the respective village by using different PRA tools. The visioning
exercise helps the villagers in thinking about the quality of education through a better
school environment. The key questions for visioning include, but are not limited to,
physical facilities in a school (rooms, furniture, playground and toilets etc), teachers and
other issues. The VA provides a common forum for teachers, parents and other key role
players in a village or school vicinity to share their concerns and thinking with each
other. During the first meeting the participants also identify and select capable people
(community members and/or teachers) to develop a formal plan for school improvement.
Planning
A formal SIP is presented in the second VA (VA2) wherein the community reviews the
plans jointly. Participants are encouraged to take part in the discussions and prioritize the
needs mentioned in the plan. For timely implementation of the plan, the tasks mentioned
in the plan are assigned to various community members in the presence of the
participants. Community contribution in the form of material, time and finances is
frequently observed in the VAs. Community members pledge their time, money and other
resources voluntarily to improve the conditions of the schools for quality education in the
villages.
Resource mobilization and utilization
Apart from community contributions during VAs, the community evolves a strategy for
resource mobilization according to the SIP. The available and committed resources are
discussed and allocated in the 3rd village assembly (VA3 in Figure 1). The
- Assessment
- Thinking
- Sharing of visions and concerns
- Identification of the right people to develop a plan
- Presentation of School Improvement Plan
- Discussions and amendments
- Prioritization of needs
- Action planning
- Fund securing,
- Resource mobilization
- Review of School Improvement Plan (SIP)
- Creating new institutions and strengthening existing ones
- Review of Progress of SIP implementation
- Reallocation of resources
7
implementation strategy is devised to effectively utilize the available resources. A
reporting and M&E mechanism with responsibilities is also devised to ensure
accountability.
Participatory Monitoring
The VA undertakes the monitoring of its sessions through a review of progress and an
assessment of future needs. Other stakeholders like donors, the Education Department
and facilitating NGOs can also take part in the sessions as part of the participatory
monitoring. During the session, participants ask critical questions and these are answered
in a democratic manner.
Impacts
In the absence of a working democracy, participation of the local people in the planning
and implementation of the development process has been a challenge for the
transparency, accountability and efficiency of the process. The VA experience has been
instrumental in ensuring the participation of people at the grassroots level.
Within a period of three to four months 1,061 VAs were conducted for the first time in
the area and the same number of assemblies for the second time in three tehsils (Khairpur
Mirs, Thari Mirwah and Kotdeji) of two districts (Sukkur and Khairpur). A total number
of more than 51,000 people participated in the visioning and planning of schools at the
grassroots level, including 1,900 women. Although the women’s participation was less
than that of the men, it was the first time that women were involved in the visioning and
planning of schools. During these hundred days the local communities developed more
than one thousand SIPs with a follow-up mechanism for monitoring implementation.
The way ahead
More than 6,000 VAs are planned under the DEMO project by the year 2006. In this way
communities will be facilitated in developing 3,000 SIPs, with the training of 15,000
community activists in various basic management skills to strengthen the community
initiatives at the grassroots level. Out of the 3,000 communities approximately 650 will
be assisted in the formation of Community Citizen Boards (CCBs) and registration under
the law. These CCBs will be legal entities and will also be eligible to access funds from
governmental and non-governmental sources.
Conclusion
If supported and encouraged, VAs have the potential to provide a breeding ground for the
nurturing of community-based institutions at the village level. On the one hand, VAs
have the potential to act as general bodies for the local institutions, and on the other, these
forums will ensure accountability and transparency in a democratic manner through the
ownership of initiatives.
8
References
Annual Project Document of Democratized Education Management and Ownership.
2004. Islamabad: LEAD- Pakistan. (Unpublished)
Annual World Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People. 2004.
Washington: The World Bank
Annual The Next Ascent. 2002. An Evaluation of the Aga Khan Rural Support Program,
Pakistan. Washington: The World Bank
Najam, Adil. 2000. The Four C’s of NGO-Government Relations. Islamabad: LEADPakistan
Websites:
Leadership for Environment And Development Pakistan.
Office of the Community Development Rural Development US Department of
Agriculture, Washington, DC.
Palas Valley Conservation and Development Project (PCDP)
National Rural Support Program.
Brief Note on Violent Conflict in Sindh
1. The May 12 Events
The events of May 12 2007 have highlighted once again the violence that has been
endemic to Sindh’s politics over the past three decades. Over 40 people were killed in
ambushes, armed clashes and execution-style killings across the city, on a day when
the Chief Justice of Pakistan had planned to address a gathering of judges and lawyers
at the Sindh High Court. Large parts of the city were blocked for traffic with freight
containers and other vehicles commandeered the night before having been parked
across roads, streets and bridges. State security agencies were mostly absent from the
scene. Activists of political parties, notably the governing party Muttahida Quami
Movement (MQM), and opposition parties including Pakistan People’s Party (PPP),
Awami National Party (ANP), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), and Jamaate-
Islami (JI) were the main protagonists in the violent clashes.
There are many other aspects of the events of May 12 that need to be investigated and
recorded. Three courts in the city – the Sindh High Court, the Malir District Court,
and the City Courts – were surrounded by armed supporters of the MQM from the
morning onwards. Journalists and television stations were targeted and attacked. The
airport was virtually besieged with passengers, including the Chief Justice and his
team, being unable to drive or even walk into the city. While several independent TV
stations were broadcasting live images of the chaos “facts” were becoming increasing
contested as the day wore on.
An independent investigation into the events will be a crucial starting point in moving
ahead. In principle, it is difficult to see how the state and various individuals and
organizations acting for it can absolve themselves of the primary responsibility for the
May 12 events. This quite naturally means that the spotlight will fall on the federal
government and its agencies, the various arms of the provincial and city governments,
and the MQM. Questions will remain about the details of state responsibility and its
apportionment, as well as the role of non-state and opposition actors in the violence.
In the meanwhile it is possible to identify and analyse some of the longer term
political and institutional issues in Sindh that were made salient on May 12. Two
2
themes stand out: (a) the role, ideology and organizational ethos of MQM; (b) ethnic
conflict; and these are discussed in more detail.
1.1 The MQM Factor
The MQM which is the larger partner in the Sindh provincial government, and runs
the City District Government of Karachi (CDGK) has often been characterized as an
“ethnically-based mafia”.1 The party did, indeed, emerge from an ethnically-based
student organization (All Pakistan Mohajir Students’ Organization or APMSO) in the
early 1980s in order to promote the interests of the Urdu-speaking migrants from
India. MQM argued that these migrants or Mohajirs and their descendents constituted
a distinct ethnic or sub-national community that was discriminated against in jobs and
educational opportunities, and was vulnerable to harassment by other ethnic groups
that had formed violent organizations in Karachi. In the mid-1980s MQM evolved
quickly into a militant organization with a highly-motivated cadre trained in the use of
lethal weapons. It won municipal polls under General Zia’s military government in
1987, and then won a majority of the national and provincial assembly seats in
Karachi in the general elections of 1988.
Despite electoral success the MQM was unable to shed its militant image, or indeed
its militant ethos. The organizational structure was tightly controlled by the core
leadership, and force was a common way of dealing with political rivals as well as
internal dissenters. The party was widely thought to be associated with at least three
types of violent activities: (i) campus violence between student cadres of various
parties; (ii) ethnic clashes with various non-Mohajir ethnic groups; (iii) extortion
rackets targeting individuals and businesses in Karachi.2 State agencies first
confronted the MQM in an aborted operation in 1990, then again in 1992, and then
finally between 1993 and 1996. There were reports of widespread human rights
abuses during these security operations.
It is noteworthy that despite intermittent security operations against the MQM the
party was part of the ruling coalition in Sindh (with representation in national
government) in 1988-89, 1990-1992, and 1997-98. In 1997 the party changed its
name from Mohajir Quami Movement to Muttahida Quami Movement (that is, united
national movement). It ostensibly abandoned its ethnic ideology and re-fashioned
itself as a champion of the middle and lower classes in an otherwise “feudaldominated”
political system. The MQM remained under state pressure during the
early part of the General Pervez Musharraf’s military rule. It boycotted the 2001 local
government elections on the grounds that it continued to face state persecution. The
military regime fully rehabilitated the organisation in 2002 when it contested the
national and provincial elections, and emerged as the senior partner in the Sindh
provincial government. It currently holds the office of the provincial governor,
occupies over half the ministerial slots in the provincial government, controls the
CDGK, and has three ministers in the federal cabinet.
1 See, for example, The Economist, 19th-25th May 2007, “Pakistan, on the edge”.
2 Supporters of MQM argue that the party used violence only for self-defence. This may, indeed, have
been the case on many occasions. The fact that the party was at least associated with violent activities
is not disputed.
3
The party claims to have abandoned its ethnic ideology in the favour of a more
inclusive multi-ethnic class-based programme. It professes to be secular and liberal,
and is vocal in its support for women’s rights, and its opposition to religious
fundamentalism.3 It has not been able to shed its militant image, however, and it is
widely believed to deploy strong-arm mafia-like means to silence its critics. On May
3, for example, MQM councillors in the City Council were caught on camera
physically assaulting opposition councillors (including some women councillors) who
had questioned the ruling of the chair on a procedural matter. The fact that violence
was so readily used in a chamber where the MQM ought not to have felt threatened by
the opposition (it holds over two-thirds of the seats) signalled that the organization
had some way to go in internalising democratic norms. For some of MQM’s
detractors the events of May 12 confirmed the suspicion that there was something
“inherently” violent and even “fascistic” about the party.4
1.2 Ethnic Conflict
While the violence on May 12 was political – in the sense that it was connected to a
political tussle – it carried menacing undertones of ethnic conflict. There were several
alleged instances of ethnically-targeted killings on the day and in its aftermath. Some
of the parties have clear ethnic bases. Although the MQM is nominally no longer an
ethnic organization, it is widely believed to be a largely Mohajir party. On the other
side, Pakhtun nationalist parties were prominent among the opposition. Ethnicity
appeared to play a role in the developments leading up to May 12, on the day itself,
and in the aftermath.
The political “preparation” of both sides had strong hints of the ethnic factor from the
outset. Although ostensibly a multi-ethnic party, the MQM’s core support base
remains in the Urdu-speaking Mohajir community in Sindh. The party’s supporters
frequently make reference to ethnic affinity as a key reason for the positive
relationship between MQM and General Pervez Musharraf. This is, obviously, based
on perceptions of solidarity rather than any concrete evidence of ethnic discrimination
on the part of the president. In the run-up to the events of May 12 the idea that MQM
ought to stand by a Mohajir president was reportedly used to persuade sceptical party
supporters.
The ethnic factor was also implicitly reinforced in the way in which the MQM
prepared for May 12. Road-blocks were raised around those localities where there are
large concentrations of non-Mohajirs. This was not necessarily an ethnic policy. The
3 MQM leaders take great pride in the fact that they have “rescued” the Urdu-speaking community from
the stranglehold of religious and sectarian movements. Some of the original founding members of the
organization had left the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba (IJT) which is the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami.
The IJT was known to be well-armed in the 1980s, and MQM’s early campus skirmishes were mostly
against the IJT.
4 A former head of the ISI declared on a TV talk show that by 1990 the state security establishment had
already formed the view that MQM was “more than simply a political party”. He suggested that that
understanding was still valid (General Asad Durrani on a show hosted by Ayaz Amir, ARYOneWorld
TV, 19 May 2007). Similar views were expressed from the other end of the political spectrum at a
meeting hosted by the Sindh Democratic Forum on 22 May in Karachi where politicians and
intellectuals from various left-leaning called for a ban on the organization.
4
party rightly believed that its political opponents had a stronger presence in the non-
Mohajir areas, and it was therefore necessary to prevent any movement from these
localities. The effect, however, was to divide the city into routes and areas that were
free of road-blocks and areas that were blockaded. This division happened to
correspond, roughly, with ethnic boundaries within the city.5
The other side too had implicitly or explicitly used ethnicity in its mobilization against
the MQM. A number of development initiatives of the CDGK are bound to create
losers. These include residents of outlying villages and irregular settlements, those
who have encroached upon public land, and economic stakeholders such as
transporters. From 2002 onwards, and particularly after the election of MQMdominated
local governments in 2005 (in elections marred by violence and widely
alleged to have been rigged), there have been steady complaints that non-Mohajir
communities faced discrimination in the removal of encroachments, in the conversion
of land use, and in the regulation of public transport. Pakhtuns in particular began
organizing themselves in order to protect themselves from what they regarded as a
“planned ethnic annihilation” from Karachi. Some of that mobilization was clearly
evident on May 12.
The violence on May 12 made ethnic divisions more salient. Some of the victims
were, indeed, unconcerned individuals who were targeted for their ethnicity. In the
midst of the violence it was easy for the political veneer to drop and for people to refer
to “Mohajirs” and “Pakhtuns” fighting, rather than say that the MQM and
ANP/PMAP activists were fighting. At the level of national politics the May 12
events made the ethnic connection between the MQM and General Pervez Musharraf
more salient. The ethnic barbs obviously stung, as the president made several public
attempts to refute such insinuations.
There were hurried attempts in the aftermath of the violence, however, to allay the
ethnic factor. The memory of the “bad old days” was invoked in order to pull back
the protagonists from open ethnic conflict. All parties made painstaking public
statements about the conflict being “political” rather than “ethnic”. Ironically (and
fortunately), the idea that Karachi was an ethnic tinderbox was an effective one in
persuading all sides from further escalation. Ethnic tensions have nevertheless been
heightened after May 12, and political and social issues in the city are more likely to
be viewed through ethnic filters in near future.
2. Broader Perspectives
While the recent events in Karachi inject urgency into the analysis of conflict it is
important to view them in a broader geographical and historical perspective. Violent
conflict in Sindh is not restricted to Karachi or to urban centres where there might be
ethnic tensions between ethnic groups and parties. Karachi accounted for around onethird
of the total population of Sindh, and all urban areas taken together had just under
5 This implicit division of the city into Mohajir and non-Mohajir localities was acknowledged by MQM
spokepersons in the aftermath of May 12, when they put the blame of the violence on the latter
localities.
5
half of the province’s population in 1998.6 Urban ethnic conflict is conspicuous
because of Sindh’s peculiar ethnic demography and the visibility of urban areas.
2.1 Sindhis and Mohajirs
The majority ethnic group of Sindh – the indigenous Sindhis – are a small minority in
Karachi, and a large minority in the second city Hyderabad. Ethnic tensions between
Sindhis and Mohajirs (who constitute the single largest ethnic group in urban Sindh)
are sometimes interpreted in terms of a rural-urban divide. This same ethnic tension
is also interpreted as a conflict between settler migrants and indigenous people. These
two types of tensions – i.e. rural versus urban, and settler versus indigenous – are also
present elsewhere in Pakistan. They might be considered to be particularly intractable
in Sindh because three potential sources of tension – ethnicity, rural-urban divide, and
settler-indigenous divide – appear to be compounded into one.
In fact, upon closer examination, it appears that there are relatively few (if
conspicuous) points of direct social or economic conflict between ethnic Sindhis and
Mohajirs. Moreover, the correspondence between the three potential sources of
tension – ethnicity, rural-urban difference, and settler-indigenous rivalry – is less exact
than it first appears.
Complementary rather than rival
The urban and rural economies of Sindh have operated in conditions of
complementarity rather than rivalry. Industry and commerce have relied on supplies
from rural areas, and agriculture has depended on urban markets. The economic
relationship between rural Sindhis and urban non-Sindhis has largely been mediated
through market institutions. Markets are not ethnically anonymous, in the sense that it
is widely perceived that various ethnic and caste groups “control” different markets.
In the markets that matter in the rural-urban relationship, however, there is no “one-toone”
ethnic face-off between market participants. While a particular market might be
dominated by commission agents and merchants belonging to a particular ethnic
group, such domination is generally localised and does not translate into economywide
collusion. The groups that dominate markets also tend to be ethnically and
religiously diverse: Punjabi settlers, Mohajirs, Sindhi Vanyas, Sindhi Sheikhs, and
Pashtuns, depending on area and produce.
Not a rural issue
The Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic difference is no longer, by and large, an indigenous versus
settler issue in the rural areas. Ethnic Sindhis believe that settler migrants were
favoured in the allotment of state-owned irrigated land in many parts of the province
at the expense of local peasants. The complaint, however, is largely against Punjabi
settlers and not the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs who mostly abandoned any agricultural
holdings that they had in favour of an urban life.
6 Population Census 1998.
6
Access to public sector opportunities
Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic rivalry remains important in the allocation of public sector
opportunities such as places in higher education institutions and government jobs.
The “rural quota” in college places and jobs that was introduced in the 1970s in order
to increase the opportunities available to ethnic Sindhis was resented by many
Mohajirs. It was also taken up as a rallying issue by the MQM when it was explicitly
an ethnic Mohajir party. The issue has lost some of its potential for mobilisation due
to two wider economic changes. First, the quality of education in public colleges and
universities has steadily declined and many more higher education places are on offer
in the private sector. Second, the government’s role as employer is on the decline.
Sharing of urban space
Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic rivalry does continue to have some economic basis in the
sharing of urban spaces. The loss of Karachi (or the loss of their majority in Karachi)
is seen by some ethnic Sindhis as a major source of political and economic weakness.
To the extent that urban spaces are not ethnically-neutral, it does matter who is in
control of a city. In Karachi, however, the ethnic Sindhis are a small minority, smaller
numerically than Punjabis and Pakhtuns. Ethnic tension concerning the “sharing” of
Karachi, therefore, is not primarily between Sindhis and Mohajirs. Rather, if such
ethnic tension will indeed be important, the potential lines of conflict will be more
complex than Sindhis versus Mohajirs. In the smaller cities of Sindh, notably
Hyderabad, the Sindhi-Mohajir rivalry over the sharing of urban spaces is more
conspicuous. In fact, during the late 1980s and 1990s there was a virtual ethnic
segregation of Hyderabad between Sindhi and Mohajir neighbourhoods respectively.
Common concerns and rivalry
The two main ethnic groups in Sindh – ethnic Sindhis and Mohajirs – will continue to
have points of tension and rivalry over resources. In addition to the familiar issues
some new factors that might pose future challenges have emerged. Prominent among
these is the acquisition of land for infrastructure and commercial development, and
the conversion of land from agricultural to non-agriculture use. By and large,
however, there are more points of potential social and economic cooperation between
the two main ethnic groups than there are points of rivalry.
This leaves the question of political rivalry between the two main ethnic groups. It is
believed by some that ethnic Sindhis and Mohajirs end up in rival political camps
because of underlying ethnic divisions. Parties and coalitions have been careful,
however, to ensure some level of ethnic balance and representation. Although the
PPP is often regarded as a mostly-Sindhi party, it did enjoy support among sections of
the Mohajir community and accommodated members of that community in
government. MQM which started out as a Mohajir ethnic party has ostensibly opened
itself to all ethnic groups and fields Sindhi and other non-Mohajir politicians. It has
also entered alliances and coalitions with mostly-Sindhi parties.
7
2.2 Migration and ethnicity7
Ethnic-based mobilisation and violence in Sindh in general and Karachi in particular
needs to be understood within the historical context of migration. At the time of
independence Sindh was ethnically homogenous and religiously heterogenous. After
independence and partition the province lost its religious heterogeneity as large
numbers of Hindus were forced to leave for India. Muslim migrants from India took
their places, particularly in the urban areas. Over the decades economic opportunities
in Karachi attracted further migrants from other parts of Pakistan, and indeed other
countries.
A combination of the sheer weight of migration, and the absence of political will in
formulating a pro-active response, meant that the state adopted a laissez-faire posture
towards city expansion. The early migrants from India were put up in make-shift
camps, some on public land, and others on land offered by local landowners. Urban
regulation was effectively put on hold. This pattern persisted, however, even after the
initial migrants had been settled. Every new wave of migration led to the further
expansion of irregular settlements (katchi abadis) and the systematic violation of
regulations in existing localities. There was informalisation of most civic functions
and amenities such as water supply, sewage, transport and even electricity provision.
Most importantly, an entire land economy emerged where it became the norm for
transactions in qabza or possession regardless of actual legal ownership.
While the informalisation of civic amenities lowered the costs of migration, and was
celebrated by some as a more efficient solution to the problems of urbanisation than
formal state provision, it had its own institutional implications. One was the
emergence of various “mafias” – or local strongmen – who could enforce informal
contracts under conditions of legal ambiguity. There was a steady legitimisation of
private violence, and an effective withdrawal of the formal state system. State
functionaries, in fact, were often the key agents around whom these “mafias”
operated. Secondly, the absence of formal state systems reinforced ethnic and kinship
based social networks for protection and the organization of collective action.
By the 1980s it was widely believed that the city had been turned over to a “transport
mafia”, a “water mafia”, a “land mafia” and many other such “mafias”. Many of these
“mafias” were perceived to be held together by ethnic bonds. When the MQM first
emerged on the scene with the project of mobilising Mohajirs on an ethnic basis, its
slogans found quick resonance among people who felt that they could only be
protected if they also had an ethnic organization of their own. Moreover, the idea that
the ethnic organization should be militant and armed was seen as entirely legitimate in
the conditions that already prevailed.
2.3 Violent conflict in rural Sindh
While public discussion of ethnic conflict in urban Sindh – and the potential for
conflict between urban and rural Sindhis – is conspicuous, violent conflict in rural
7 This sub-section draws upon Gazdar, Haris (2006), “Migration and Urban Governance”, in Marcello
Balbo (ed), International Migration and the City, (UN-Habitat and the IUAV University of Venice).
8
Sindh is often ignored in the national press. In fact rural violence – not simply crime
but organized conflict between groups – has probably been as great a source of actual
casualties as its urban counterpart. Virtual warfare between tribes and kinship groups,
particularly in the districts of upper Sindh routinely claims dozens of lives. It is
tempting to argue that long-running blood feuds are an unremarkable aspect of the
traditional rural society. In fact, the scale and persistence of violence and lawlessness
in rural Sindh underwent a qualitative shift in the 1980s, and has escalated even
further in the most recent period.
Part of the explanation is “technical” – that is, the relatively easy availability of lethal
weapons. There are also prominent political and institutional factors at play. In some
ways the escalation of violent tribal conflict in rural Sindh has similar roots to the rise
in urban violence. The steady withdrawal and weakening of the formal institutions of
the state has increased the prominence and power of traditional leaders and kinshipbased
social networks. The assault on party-based politics further expands the power
of the traditional leadership at the expense of other forms of mobilization. Some of
the key players in the escalation of violent tribal conflict are precisely those leaders
who are routinely sought by unrepresentative military governments as their civilian
partners.
2.4 Religious fundamentalism and sectarian violence
Religious and sectarian violence in Sindh has been relatively less conspicuous than
other parts of the country. Sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni Muslims were
limited to particular days and events and were handled effectively through civil and
police action. In general the relations between the various religious and sectarian
communities have been amicable. There are strong syncretic traditions among ethnic
Sindhis and barring a few trouble-spots the Shia-Sunni violence was mostly confined
to the ethnic Mohajir community. There were conscious efforts to block sectarian
conflict in that community, and these efforts are prominent among the origin myths of
the MQM.
In the 1990s, however, religious and sectarian conflict appeared in a very different
form in urban Sindh. While there were very few instances of clashes between
ordinary members of various sects, terrorist attacks on congregations and targeted
assassinations became more common.
More alarmingly, there appear to have been common strands between sectarian
terrorism and ethnic militancy. Although the MQM is clearly a non-religious and
non-sectarian organization, there is evidence that in periods of persecution many of its
militant cadre shifted to sectarian religious militant organizations for protection. One
off-shoot of this easy transition of militant cadres is the current violent conflict
between the MQM and the Sunni Tehrik which is clearly a denominational
organization of Barelvi Sunnis. The Sunni Tehrik is thought to be made of up former
MQM cadre that “turned” under pressure from state agencies.
2.5 Repression, state collapse and political terror
9
The disparate forms of violent conflict in Sindh have some common roots. The 1980s
was a watershed period in the rise of militant ethnic politics as well as rural violence.
Many political analysts do not regard this as a coincidence. The military regime of
General Zia-ul-Haq was strongly resisted in Sindh, particularly in the rural areas that
were partisans of the executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Mohajirdominated
urban areas had been opposed to Bhutto, but they too had gradually turned
against General Zia’s regime as they saw little representation of their interests. In fact,
Zia was regarded by many Mohajirs as promoting Punjabi interests at their expense.
The early 1980s witnessed a mass political movement for democracy across Sindh
including parts of Karachi. This movement was brutally suppressed by the military –
demonstrators were frequently fired upon, thousands of people were detained and
tortured, and there was a clampdown on all political activities. The civil
administration virtually collapsed over much of the province. The repression led to
the rise of ethnic nationalism among Sindhis who felt that they had no voice in
Pakistan. In the meanwhile, many commentators believe that the Zia regime actively
encourage ethnic militants among both Sindhis and Mohajirs in order to create
diversions away from what had been, in essence, a movement for the restoration of
democracy.
This same period also witnessed an erosion of the formal civil institutions of the state.
In the rural areas of Sindh this happened under the pressure of protest. In urban areas,
particularly Karachi, the 1980s simply saw a culmination of the preceding decades of
neglect of urban governance. The state’s civilian institutions not only lost their
legitimacy under military rule, they had also lost coherence and capacity through
decades of neglect.
In rural Sindh the suppression of the democratic movement led to a rise in banditry
and ethnic nationalism. In fact, some bandits became nationalist icons for resisting
armed organs of the state. In urban areas the MQM emerged from relatively obscurity
to becoming the largest “super-mafia” with an ethnic ideology. The easy availability
of weapons, partly due to the way in which Pakistan’s military government managed
the “Afghan jihad”, and partly through more direct policies of the state agencies, led
to the entrenchment of political and social violence.
In the period between 1988 and 1999 – that is, between the military regimes of
General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf respectively – there were various
successful and unsuccessful attempts at managing violent conflict. In the urban areas
conflict escalated as the MQM jostled for political power, and was used by opposition
political actors as well as the state security agencies to undermine incumbent civil
governments. State security agencies, however, got behind a coherent effort at
restricting MQM’s militancy in 1994-1996. After a period of intense violence and
human rights abuses the MQM’s military ability was significantly dented, and the
party abandoned its narrow ethnic base. In rural Sindh there were successful
operations against some of the most notorious gangs of bandits, and some
conspicuous instances of legal accountability of errant state personnel helped to win
over popular support for such operations. The result was a significant decline in
outlaw activity by the late 1990s.
10
Although the post-1999 period was considerably different from the military regime of
General Zia-ul-Haq, some structural similarities are notable. Like General Zia, the
Musharraf regime regarded Sindh as a haven of political opposition. In order to
emasculate the strong presence of opposition political parties (particularly the PPP)
the regime relied on the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad, and promoted disparate
local notables and strongmen in all other districts. In many of these districts the local
strongmen built up virtual fiefs through the abuse of the state machinery, and
alarmingly, through the mobilisation of tribal networks. Although the Musharraf and
Zia regimes had very different ideological proclivities at the national level their effects
in Sindh were quite similar: encouragement of MQM militancy in the main cities, and
the escalation of apparently non-political social violence in the rural areas.
3. Ways Forward
The reduction and prevention of violent conflict in Sindh requires action along four
lines: (a) acceptance of the genuine democratic mandate of political parties with
popular support bases; (b) rehabilitation of the legitimate civil authority of the formal
institutions of the state including the judiciary, the police as well as the social service
delivery infrastructure; (c) dismantling and decommissioning of militant organizations
which have been set up and nurtured by state security agencies in successive periods;
(d) deweaponisation of politics and society.
These four lines of action appear to be extremely vague, general and ambitious. There
are, however, short to medium term measures by various actors that might help move
things in positive or negative directions. Some of these short to medium term
implications are spelled out below.
3.1 Accepting the democratic mandate
Accepting the democratic mandate at all levels of government – national, provincial
and local – minimally requires allowing all political parties to participate freely in fair
elections. In the context of Sindh is requires more than that. The pre-emption of any
party, particularly those that are known to have solid electoral bases (such as the PPP
but also the MQM) leads to distortions in the political system. The rise of ethnic
nationalism, violent conflict, tribalism, and political terror in Sindh can be traced back
directly to such efforts. There needs to be a complete acceptance in the higher
echelons of the state that parties that regularly prove themselves at the ballot cannot be
treated as being anti-national.
A problem here is the strong suspicion that some of the parties in Sindh, notably the
MQM, might not themselves have internalised a democratic political ethos. Attempts
by the party to acquire absolute monopoly over all political and social activities in its
professed domain makes the task of democratization all the more complicated. Some
level of cooperation between the PPP and the MQM – even if this is cooperation
across benches – is essential for the prevention of violent conflict in Sindh. This
appears to be a distant prospect in the wake of May 12. Efforts need to be made to
persuade the parties, particularly the MQM, to accept the prospect of political
partnership rather than clinging on to unrealisable hopes of totalitarian control. A
11
useful, though painful, starting point might be an independent inquiry into the events
of May 12.
3.2 Rehabilitating legitimate civil authority
Accountable civil administration, working alongside an independent judiciary and a
professional police force must successively replace the various ad hoc security
agencies operating in Sindh. It ought to be a matter of concern that much of Sindh has
been under continuous military oversight since 1977 when General Zia-ul-Haq
overthrew the civil government. Even in the period of elected civil governments
between 1988 and 1999 paramilitary Rangers (whose mandate is to guard the borders)
were in continuous deployment in Karachi and Hyderabad in order to deal with ethnic
violence. It is also striking that even during this period of turmoil instances of
demilitarization (handing over security to civil authorities) met with greater success
than military operations – in rural and urban areas alike.
3.3 Dismantling militant infrastructure
The frequent use by state agencies of militant organizations for political purposes
needs to be frankly acknowledged and discontinued. The militant infrastructure
created by state security agencies does not respect its prescribed political or even
ideological boundaries. It has been seen that militant cadre of religious organizations
have reconstituted themselves into ethnic-nationalists, and vice versa. It has also been
folly to use one militant organization in order to curb the activities of another. State
security agencies must stop promoting political terror of any hue.
The first step in this direction will be to strengthen those law enforcement and state
security organizations that are under the direct control of civil administration. These
are ultimately answerable to political accountability and judicial overview. Pakistan’s
international partners in the war against terrorism must not acquiesce to “any means
necessary”. Rather, there needs to be active promotion of the legal route to
confronting militant violence of all types.
3.4 Deweaponisation
This is the most difficult line of action, and cannot be attempted outside of the context
of action along the other three lines proposed above. A deweaponisation drive carried
out in the absence of a political process is likely to fail.
The events of May 12 2007 have highlighted once again the violence that has been
endemic to Sindh’s politics over the past three decades. Over 40 people were killed in
ambushes, armed clashes and execution-style killings across the city, on a day when
the Chief Justice of Pakistan had planned to address a gathering of judges and lawyers
at the Sindh High Court. Large parts of the city were blocked for traffic with freight
containers and other vehicles commandeered the night before having been parked
across roads, streets and bridges. State security agencies were mostly absent from the
scene. Activists of political parties, notably the governing party Muttahida Quami
Movement (MQM), and opposition parties including Pakistan People’s Party (PPP),
Awami National Party (ANP), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), and Jamaate-
Islami (JI) were the main protagonists in the violent clashes.
There are many other aspects of the events of May 12 that need to be investigated and
recorded. Three courts in the city – the Sindh High Court, the Malir District Court,
and the City Courts – were surrounded by armed supporters of the MQM from the
morning onwards. Journalists and television stations were targeted and attacked. The
airport was virtually besieged with passengers, including the Chief Justice and his
team, being unable to drive or even walk into the city. While several independent TV
stations were broadcasting live images of the chaos “facts” were becoming increasing
contested as the day wore on.
An independent investigation into the events will be a crucial starting point in moving
ahead. In principle, it is difficult to see how the state and various individuals and
organizations acting for it can absolve themselves of the primary responsibility for the
May 12 events. This quite naturally means that the spotlight will fall on the federal
government and its agencies, the various arms of the provincial and city governments,
and the MQM. Questions will remain about the details of state responsibility and its
apportionment, as well as the role of non-state and opposition actors in the violence.
In the meanwhile it is possible to identify and analyse some of the longer term
political and institutional issues in Sindh that were made salient on May 12. Two
2
themes stand out: (a) the role, ideology and organizational ethos of MQM; (b) ethnic
conflict; and these are discussed in more detail.
1.1 The MQM Factor
The MQM which is the larger partner in the Sindh provincial government, and runs
the City District Government of Karachi (CDGK) has often been characterized as an
“ethnically-based mafia”.1 The party did, indeed, emerge from an ethnically-based
student organization (All Pakistan Mohajir Students’ Organization or APMSO) in the
early 1980s in order to promote the interests of the Urdu-speaking migrants from
India. MQM argued that these migrants or Mohajirs and their descendents constituted
a distinct ethnic or sub-national community that was discriminated against in jobs and
educational opportunities, and was vulnerable to harassment by other ethnic groups
that had formed violent organizations in Karachi. In the mid-1980s MQM evolved
quickly into a militant organization with a highly-motivated cadre trained in the use of
lethal weapons. It won municipal polls under General Zia’s military government in
1987, and then won a majority of the national and provincial assembly seats in
Karachi in the general elections of 1988.
Despite electoral success the MQM was unable to shed its militant image, or indeed
its militant ethos. The organizational structure was tightly controlled by the core
leadership, and force was a common way of dealing with political rivals as well as
internal dissenters. The party was widely thought to be associated with at least three
types of violent activities: (i) campus violence between student cadres of various
parties; (ii) ethnic clashes with various non-Mohajir ethnic groups; (iii) extortion
rackets targeting individuals and businesses in Karachi.2 State agencies first
confronted the MQM in an aborted operation in 1990, then again in 1992, and then
finally between 1993 and 1996. There were reports of widespread human rights
abuses during these security operations.
It is noteworthy that despite intermittent security operations against the MQM the
party was part of the ruling coalition in Sindh (with representation in national
government) in 1988-89, 1990-1992, and 1997-98. In 1997 the party changed its
name from Mohajir Quami Movement to Muttahida Quami Movement (that is, united
national movement). It ostensibly abandoned its ethnic ideology and re-fashioned
itself as a champion of the middle and lower classes in an otherwise “feudaldominated”
political system. The MQM remained under state pressure during the
early part of the General Pervez Musharraf’s military rule. It boycotted the 2001 local
government elections on the grounds that it continued to face state persecution. The
military regime fully rehabilitated the organisation in 2002 when it contested the
national and provincial elections, and emerged as the senior partner in the Sindh
provincial government. It currently holds the office of the provincial governor,
occupies over half the ministerial slots in the provincial government, controls the
CDGK, and has three ministers in the federal cabinet.
1 See, for example, The Economist, 19th-25th May 2007, “Pakistan, on the edge”.
2 Supporters of MQM argue that the party used violence only for self-defence. This may, indeed, have
been the case on many occasions. The fact that the party was at least associated with violent activities
is not disputed.
3
The party claims to have abandoned its ethnic ideology in the favour of a more
inclusive multi-ethnic class-based programme. It professes to be secular and liberal,
and is vocal in its support for women’s rights, and its opposition to religious
fundamentalism.3 It has not been able to shed its militant image, however, and it is
widely believed to deploy strong-arm mafia-like means to silence its critics. On May
3, for example, MQM councillors in the City Council were caught on camera
physically assaulting opposition councillors (including some women councillors) who
had questioned the ruling of the chair on a procedural matter. The fact that violence
was so readily used in a chamber where the MQM ought not to have felt threatened by
the opposition (it holds over two-thirds of the seats) signalled that the organization
had some way to go in internalising democratic norms. For some of MQM’s
detractors the events of May 12 confirmed the suspicion that there was something
“inherently” violent and even “fascistic” about the party.4
1.2 Ethnic Conflict
While the violence on May 12 was political – in the sense that it was connected to a
political tussle – it carried menacing undertones of ethnic conflict. There were several
alleged instances of ethnically-targeted killings on the day and in its aftermath. Some
of the parties have clear ethnic bases. Although the MQM is nominally no longer an
ethnic organization, it is widely believed to be a largely Mohajir party. On the other
side, Pakhtun nationalist parties were prominent among the opposition. Ethnicity
appeared to play a role in the developments leading up to May 12, on the day itself,
and in the aftermath.
The political “preparation” of both sides had strong hints of the ethnic factor from the
outset. Although ostensibly a multi-ethnic party, the MQM’s core support base
remains in the Urdu-speaking Mohajir community in Sindh. The party’s supporters
frequently make reference to ethnic affinity as a key reason for the positive
relationship between MQM and General Pervez Musharraf. This is, obviously, based
on perceptions of solidarity rather than any concrete evidence of ethnic discrimination
on the part of the president. In the run-up to the events of May 12 the idea that MQM
ought to stand by a Mohajir president was reportedly used to persuade sceptical party
supporters.
The ethnic factor was also implicitly reinforced in the way in which the MQM
prepared for May 12. Road-blocks were raised around those localities where there are
large concentrations of non-Mohajirs. This was not necessarily an ethnic policy. The
3 MQM leaders take great pride in the fact that they have “rescued” the Urdu-speaking community from
the stranglehold of religious and sectarian movements. Some of the original founding members of the
organization had left the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba (IJT) which is the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami.
The IJT was known to be well-armed in the 1980s, and MQM’s early campus skirmishes were mostly
against the IJT.
4 A former head of the ISI declared on a TV talk show that by 1990 the state security establishment had
already formed the view that MQM was “more than simply a political party”. He suggested that that
understanding was still valid (General Asad Durrani on a show hosted by Ayaz Amir, ARYOneWorld
TV, 19 May 2007). Similar views were expressed from the other end of the political spectrum at a
meeting hosted by the Sindh Democratic Forum on 22 May in Karachi where politicians and
intellectuals from various left-leaning called for a ban on the organization.
4
party rightly believed that its political opponents had a stronger presence in the non-
Mohajir areas, and it was therefore necessary to prevent any movement from these
localities. The effect, however, was to divide the city into routes and areas that were
free of road-blocks and areas that were blockaded. This division happened to
correspond, roughly, with ethnic boundaries within the city.5
The other side too had implicitly or explicitly used ethnicity in its mobilization against
the MQM. A number of development initiatives of the CDGK are bound to create
losers. These include residents of outlying villages and irregular settlements, those
who have encroached upon public land, and economic stakeholders such as
transporters. From 2002 onwards, and particularly after the election of MQMdominated
local governments in 2005 (in elections marred by violence and widely
alleged to have been rigged), there have been steady complaints that non-Mohajir
communities faced discrimination in the removal of encroachments, in the conversion
of land use, and in the regulation of public transport. Pakhtuns in particular began
organizing themselves in order to protect themselves from what they regarded as a
“planned ethnic annihilation” from Karachi. Some of that mobilization was clearly
evident on May 12.
The violence on May 12 made ethnic divisions more salient. Some of the victims
were, indeed, unconcerned individuals who were targeted for their ethnicity. In the
midst of the violence it was easy for the political veneer to drop and for people to refer
to “Mohajirs” and “Pakhtuns” fighting, rather than say that the MQM and
ANP/PMAP activists were fighting. At the level of national politics the May 12
events made the ethnic connection between the MQM and General Pervez Musharraf
more salient. The ethnic barbs obviously stung, as the president made several public
attempts to refute such insinuations.
There were hurried attempts in the aftermath of the violence, however, to allay the
ethnic factor. The memory of the “bad old days” was invoked in order to pull back
the protagonists from open ethnic conflict. All parties made painstaking public
statements about the conflict being “political” rather than “ethnic”. Ironically (and
fortunately), the idea that Karachi was an ethnic tinderbox was an effective one in
persuading all sides from further escalation. Ethnic tensions have nevertheless been
heightened after May 12, and political and social issues in the city are more likely to
be viewed through ethnic filters in near future.
2. Broader Perspectives
While the recent events in Karachi inject urgency into the analysis of conflict it is
important to view them in a broader geographical and historical perspective. Violent
conflict in Sindh is not restricted to Karachi or to urban centres where there might be
ethnic tensions between ethnic groups and parties. Karachi accounted for around onethird
of the total population of Sindh, and all urban areas taken together had just under
5 This implicit division of the city into Mohajir and non-Mohajir localities was acknowledged by MQM
spokepersons in the aftermath of May 12, when they put the blame of the violence on the latter
localities.
5
half of the province’s population in 1998.6 Urban ethnic conflict is conspicuous
because of Sindh’s peculiar ethnic demography and the visibility of urban areas.
2.1 Sindhis and Mohajirs
The majority ethnic group of Sindh – the indigenous Sindhis – are a small minority in
Karachi, and a large minority in the second city Hyderabad. Ethnic tensions between
Sindhis and Mohajirs (who constitute the single largest ethnic group in urban Sindh)
are sometimes interpreted in terms of a rural-urban divide. This same ethnic tension
is also interpreted as a conflict between settler migrants and indigenous people. These
two types of tensions – i.e. rural versus urban, and settler versus indigenous – are also
present elsewhere in Pakistan. They might be considered to be particularly intractable
in Sindh because three potential sources of tension – ethnicity, rural-urban divide, and
settler-indigenous divide – appear to be compounded into one.
In fact, upon closer examination, it appears that there are relatively few (if
conspicuous) points of direct social or economic conflict between ethnic Sindhis and
Mohajirs. Moreover, the correspondence between the three potential sources of
tension – ethnicity, rural-urban difference, and settler-indigenous rivalry – is less exact
than it first appears.
Complementary rather than rival
The urban and rural economies of Sindh have operated in conditions of
complementarity rather than rivalry. Industry and commerce have relied on supplies
from rural areas, and agriculture has depended on urban markets. The economic
relationship between rural Sindhis and urban non-Sindhis has largely been mediated
through market institutions. Markets are not ethnically anonymous, in the sense that it
is widely perceived that various ethnic and caste groups “control” different markets.
In the markets that matter in the rural-urban relationship, however, there is no “one-toone”
ethnic face-off between market participants. While a particular market might be
dominated by commission agents and merchants belonging to a particular ethnic
group, such domination is generally localised and does not translate into economywide
collusion. The groups that dominate markets also tend to be ethnically and
religiously diverse: Punjabi settlers, Mohajirs, Sindhi Vanyas, Sindhi Sheikhs, and
Pashtuns, depending on area and produce.
Not a rural issue
The Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic difference is no longer, by and large, an indigenous versus
settler issue in the rural areas. Ethnic Sindhis believe that settler migrants were
favoured in the allotment of state-owned irrigated land in many parts of the province
at the expense of local peasants. The complaint, however, is largely against Punjabi
settlers and not the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs who mostly abandoned any agricultural
holdings that they had in favour of an urban life.
6 Population Census 1998.
6
Access to public sector opportunities
Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic rivalry remains important in the allocation of public sector
opportunities such as places in higher education institutions and government jobs.
The “rural quota” in college places and jobs that was introduced in the 1970s in order
to increase the opportunities available to ethnic Sindhis was resented by many
Mohajirs. It was also taken up as a rallying issue by the MQM when it was explicitly
an ethnic Mohajir party. The issue has lost some of its potential for mobilisation due
to two wider economic changes. First, the quality of education in public colleges and
universities has steadily declined and many more higher education places are on offer
in the private sector. Second, the government’s role as employer is on the decline.
Sharing of urban space
Sindhi-Mohajir ethnic rivalry does continue to have some economic basis in the
sharing of urban spaces. The loss of Karachi (or the loss of their majority in Karachi)
is seen by some ethnic Sindhis as a major source of political and economic weakness.
To the extent that urban spaces are not ethnically-neutral, it does matter who is in
control of a city. In Karachi, however, the ethnic Sindhis are a small minority, smaller
numerically than Punjabis and Pakhtuns. Ethnic tension concerning the “sharing” of
Karachi, therefore, is not primarily between Sindhis and Mohajirs. Rather, if such
ethnic tension will indeed be important, the potential lines of conflict will be more
complex than Sindhis versus Mohajirs. In the smaller cities of Sindh, notably
Hyderabad, the Sindhi-Mohajir rivalry over the sharing of urban spaces is more
conspicuous. In fact, during the late 1980s and 1990s there was a virtual ethnic
segregation of Hyderabad between Sindhi and Mohajir neighbourhoods respectively.
Common concerns and rivalry
The two main ethnic groups in Sindh – ethnic Sindhis and Mohajirs – will continue to
have points of tension and rivalry over resources. In addition to the familiar issues
some new factors that might pose future challenges have emerged. Prominent among
these is the acquisition of land for infrastructure and commercial development, and
the conversion of land from agricultural to non-agriculture use. By and large,
however, there are more points of potential social and economic cooperation between
the two main ethnic groups than there are points of rivalry.
This leaves the question of political rivalry between the two main ethnic groups. It is
believed by some that ethnic Sindhis and Mohajirs end up in rival political camps
because of underlying ethnic divisions. Parties and coalitions have been careful,
however, to ensure some level of ethnic balance and representation. Although the
PPP is often regarded as a mostly-Sindhi party, it did enjoy support among sections of
the Mohajir community and accommodated members of that community in
government. MQM which started out as a Mohajir ethnic party has ostensibly opened
itself to all ethnic groups and fields Sindhi and other non-Mohajir politicians. It has
also entered alliances and coalitions with mostly-Sindhi parties.
7
2.2 Migration and ethnicity7
Ethnic-based mobilisation and violence in Sindh in general and Karachi in particular
needs to be understood within the historical context of migration. At the time of
independence Sindh was ethnically homogenous and religiously heterogenous. After
independence and partition the province lost its religious heterogeneity as large
numbers of Hindus were forced to leave for India. Muslim migrants from India took
their places, particularly in the urban areas. Over the decades economic opportunities
in Karachi attracted further migrants from other parts of Pakistan, and indeed other
countries.
A combination of the sheer weight of migration, and the absence of political will in
formulating a pro-active response, meant that the state adopted a laissez-faire posture
towards city expansion. The early migrants from India were put up in make-shift
camps, some on public land, and others on land offered by local landowners. Urban
regulation was effectively put on hold. This pattern persisted, however, even after the
initial migrants had been settled. Every new wave of migration led to the further
expansion of irregular settlements (katchi abadis) and the systematic violation of
regulations in existing localities. There was informalisation of most civic functions
and amenities such as water supply, sewage, transport and even electricity provision.
Most importantly, an entire land economy emerged where it became the norm for
transactions in qabza or possession regardless of actual legal ownership.
While the informalisation of civic amenities lowered the costs of migration, and was
celebrated by some as a more efficient solution to the problems of urbanisation than
formal state provision, it had its own institutional implications. One was the
emergence of various “mafias” – or local strongmen – who could enforce informal
contracts under conditions of legal ambiguity. There was a steady legitimisation of
private violence, and an effective withdrawal of the formal state system. State
functionaries, in fact, were often the key agents around whom these “mafias”
operated. Secondly, the absence of formal state systems reinforced ethnic and kinship
based social networks for protection and the organization of collective action.
By the 1980s it was widely believed that the city had been turned over to a “transport
mafia”, a “water mafia”, a “land mafia” and many other such “mafias”. Many of these
“mafias” were perceived to be held together by ethnic bonds. When the MQM first
emerged on the scene with the project of mobilising Mohajirs on an ethnic basis, its
slogans found quick resonance among people who felt that they could only be
protected if they also had an ethnic organization of their own. Moreover, the idea that
the ethnic organization should be militant and armed was seen as entirely legitimate in
the conditions that already prevailed.
2.3 Violent conflict in rural Sindh
While public discussion of ethnic conflict in urban Sindh – and the potential for
conflict between urban and rural Sindhis – is conspicuous, violent conflict in rural
7 This sub-section draws upon Gazdar, Haris (2006), “Migration and Urban Governance”, in Marcello
Balbo (ed), International Migration and the City, (UN-Habitat and the IUAV University of Venice).
8
Sindh is often ignored in the national press. In fact rural violence – not simply crime
but organized conflict between groups – has probably been as great a source of actual
casualties as its urban counterpart. Virtual warfare between tribes and kinship groups,
particularly in the districts of upper Sindh routinely claims dozens of lives. It is
tempting to argue that long-running blood feuds are an unremarkable aspect of the
traditional rural society. In fact, the scale and persistence of violence and lawlessness
in rural Sindh underwent a qualitative shift in the 1980s, and has escalated even
further in the most recent period.
Part of the explanation is “technical” – that is, the relatively easy availability of lethal
weapons. There are also prominent political and institutional factors at play. In some
ways the escalation of violent tribal conflict in rural Sindh has similar roots to the rise
in urban violence. The steady withdrawal and weakening of the formal institutions of
the state has increased the prominence and power of traditional leaders and kinshipbased
social networks. The assault on party-based politics further expands the power
of the traditional leadership at the expense of other forms of mobilization. Some of
the key players in the escalation of violent tribal conflict are precisely those leaders
who are routinely sought by unrepresentative military governments as their civilian
partners.
2.4 Religious fundamentalism and sectarian violence
Religious and sectarian violence in Sindh has been relatively less conspicuous than
other parts of the country. Sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni Muslims were
limited to particular days and events and were handled effectively through civil and
police action. In general the relations between the various religious and sectarian
communities have been amicable. There are strong syncretic traditions among ethnic
Sindhis and barring a few trouble-spots the Shia-Sunni violence was mostly confined
to the ethnic Mohajir community. There were conscious efforts to block sectarian
conflict in that community, and these efforts are prominent among the origin myths of
the MQM.
In the 1990s, however, religious and sectarian conflict appeared in a very different
form in urban Sindh. While there were very few instances of clashes between
ordinary members of various sects, terrorist attacks on congregations and targeted
assassinations became more common.
More alarmingly, there appear to have been common strands between sectarian
terrorism and ethnic militancy. Although the MQM is clearly a non-religious and
non-sectarian organization, there is evidence that in periods of persecution many of its
militant cadre shifted to sectarian religious militant organizations for protection. One
off-shoot of this easy transition of militant cadres is the current violent conflict
between the MQM and the Sunni Tehrik which is clearly a denominational
organization of Barelvi Sunnis. The Sunni Tehrik is thought to be made of up former
MQM cadre that “turned” under pressure from state agencies.
2.5 Repression, state collapse and political terror
9
The disparate forms of violent conflict in Sindh have some common roots. The 1980s
was a watershed period in the rise of militant ethnic politics as well as rural violence.
Many political analysts do not regard this as a coincidence. The military regime of
General Zia-ul-Haq was strongly resisted in Sindh, particularly in the rural areas that
were partisans of the executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Mohajirdominated
urban areas had been opposed to Bhutto, but they too had gradually turned
against General Zia’s regime as they saw little representation of their interests. In fact,
Zia was regarded by many Mohajirs as promoting Punjabi interests at their expense.
The early 1980s witnessed a mass political movement for democracy across Sindh
including parts of Karachi. This movement was brutally suppressed by the military –
demonstrators were frequently fired upon, thousands of people were detained and
tortured, and there was a clampdown on all political activities. The civil
administration virtually collapsed over much of the province. The repression led to
the rise of ethnic nationalism among Sindhis who felt that they had no voice in
Pakistan. In the meanwhile, many commentators believe that the Zia regime actively
encourage ethnic militants among both Sindhis and Mohajirs in order to create
diversions away from what had been, in essence, a movement for the restoration of
democracy.
This same period also witnessed an erosion of the formal civil institutions of the state.
In the rural areas of Sindh this happened under the pressure of protest. In urban areas,
particularly Karachi, the 1980s simply saw a culmination of the preceding decades of
neglect of urban governance. The state’s civilian institutions not only lost their
legitimacy under military rule, they had also lost coherence and capacity through
decades of neglect.
In rural Sindh the suppression of the democratic movement led to a rise in banditry
and ethnic nationalism. In fact, some bandits became nationalist icons for resisting
armed organs of the state. In urban areas the MQM emerged from relatively obscurity
to becoming the largest “super-mafia” with an ethnic ideology. The easy availability
of weapons, partly due to the way in which Pakistan’s military government managed
the “Afghan jihad”, and partly through more direct policies of the state agencies, led
to the entrenchment of political and social violence.
In the period between 1988 and 1999 – that is, between the military regimes of
General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf respectively – there were various
successful and unsuccessful attempts at managing violent conflict. In the urban areas
conflict escalated as the MQM jostled for political power, and was used by opposition
political actors as well as the state security agencies to undermine incumbent civil
governments. State security agencies, however, got behind a coherent effort at
restricting MQM’s militancy in 1994-1996. After a period of intense violence and
human rights abuses the MQM’s military ability was significantly dented, and the
party abandoned its narrow ethnic base. In rural Sindh there were successful
operations against some of the most notorious gangs of bandits, and some
conspicuous instances of legal accountability of errant state personnel helped to win
over popular support for such operations. The result was a significant decline in
outlaw activity by the late 1990s.
10
Although the post-1999 period was considerably different from the military regime of
General Zia-ul-Haq, some structural similarities are notable. Like General Zia, the
Musharraf regime regarded Sindh as a haven of political opposition. In order to
emasculate the strong presence of opposition political parties (particularly the PPP)
the regime relied on the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad, and promoted disparate
local notables and strongmen in all other districts. In many of these districts the local
strongmen built up virtual fiefs through the abuse of the state machinery, and
alarmingly, through the mobilisation of tribal networks. Although the Musharraf and
Zia regimes had very different ideological proclivities at the national level their effects
in Sindh were quite similar: encouragement of MQM militancy in the main cities, and
the escalation of apparently non-political social violence in the rural areas.
3. Ways Forward
The reduction and prevention of violent conflict in Sindh requires action along four
lines: (a) acceptance of the genuine democratic mandate of political parties with
popular support bases; (b) rehabilitation of the legitimate civil authority of the formal
institutions of the state including the judiciary, the police as well as the social service
delivery infrastructure; (c) dismantling and decommissioning of militant organizations
which have been set up and nurtured by state security agencies in successive periods;
(d) deweaponisation of politics and society.
These four lines of action appear to be extremely vague, general and ambitious. There
are, however, short to medium term measures by various actors that might help move
things in positive or negative directions. Some of these short to medium term
implications are spelled out below.
3.1 Accepting the democratic mandate
Accepting the democratic mandate at all levels of government – national, provincial
and local – minimally requires allowing all political parties to participate freely in fair
elections. In the context of Sindh is requires more than that. The pre-emption of any
party, particularly those that are known to have solid electoral bases (such as the PPP
but also the MQM) leads to distortions in the political system. The rise of ethnic
nationalism, violent conflict, tribalism, and political terror in Sindh can be traced back
directly to such efforts. There needs to be a complete acceptance in the higher
echelons of the state that parties that regularly prove themselves at the ballot cannot be
treated as being anti-national.
A problem here is the strong suspicion that some of the parties in Sindh, notably the
MQM, might not themselves have internalised a democratic political ethos. Attempts
by the party to acquire absolute monopoly over all political and social activities in its
professed domain makes the task of democratization all the more complicated. Some
level of cooperation between the PPP and the MQM – even if this is cooperation
across benches – is essential for the prevention of violent conflict in Sindh. This
appears to be a distant prospect in the wake of May 12. Efforts need to be made to
persuade the parties, particularly the MQM, to accept the prospect of political
partnership rather than clinging on to unrealisable hopes of totalitarian control. A
11
useful, though painful, starting point might be an independent inquiry into the events
of May 12.
3.2 Rehabilitating legitimate civil authority
Accountable civil administration, working alongside an independent judiciary and a
professional police force must successively replace the various ad hoc security
agencies operating in Sindh. It ought to be a matter of concern that much of Sindh has
been under continuous military oversight since 1977 when General Zia-ul-Haq
overthrew the civil government. Even in the period of elected civil governments
between 1988 and 1999 paramilitary Rangers (whose mandate is to guard the borders)
were in continuous deployment in Karachi and Hyderabad in order to deal with ethnic
violence. It is also striking that even during this period of turmoil instances of
demilitarization (handing over security to civil authorities) met with greater success
than military operations – in rural and urban areas alike.
3.3 Dismantling militant infrastructure
The frequent use by state agencies of militant organizations for political purposes
needs to be frankly acknowledged and discontinued. The militant infrastructure
created by state security agencies does not respect its prescribed political or even
ideological boundaries. It has been seen that militant cadre of religious organizations
have reconstituted themselves into ethnic-nationalists, and vice versa. It has also been
folly to use one militant organization in order to curb the activities of another. State
security agencies must stop promoting political terror of any hue.
The first step in this direction will be to strengthen those law enforcement and state
security organizations that are under the direct control of civil administration. These
are ultimately answerable to political accountability and judicial overview. Pakistan’s
international partners in the war against terrorism must not acquiesce to “any means
necessary”. Rather, there needs to be active promotion of the legal route to
confronting militant violence of all types.
3.4 Deweaponisation
This is the most difficult line of action, and cannot be attempted outside of the context
of action along the other three lines proposed above. A deweaponisation drive carried
out in the absence of a political process is likely to fail.
Problem of Thar and Kohistan of Sindh and some solutions
1. There are at least two years of no rainfall in every decade when famine conditions occur in Thar and Kohistan.
2. There can also be two consecutive years of scanty rainfall in decade, which also can result into famine conditions.
3. The famine conditions affect about one million cattle and four million goat and sheep in Eastern Desert and Kohistan Man moves out leaving cattle behind to die. Only those within 40 miles of the irrigated areas are rescued, if animals are not sick and starved. The economic loss is too great to be ignored, but we forget about it, once it rains and make a hue and cry when drought occurs again We think in terms of people and their plight at social level, their food, clothing, shelter and employment. We do not think of economics of their only possession, the animals. The loss of animals is worth many billion rupees. We feed a few thousand people and think is a great service to mankind.
4. The animal herders move to irrigated areas for food and shelter. They are exploited as labourers at low wage rates and they get compelled to sale their animals at throw away prices. When they return home, they virtually mortgage them selves and their families to buy new animals off-springs, which the whole family grazes to maturity on scantly pasture. We do not realise that these poorest of poorest Sindhis are mortgaged for an amount and a rate of interest, which they can not pay during their lifetime and this become burden of their children. This is worst than slavery.
5. We already know that in eastern desert due to lack of drinking water for animals, herdsmen pay well owners 25% of sale value of animals as their share for water This is great social injustice and exploitation of poor and solution needs to be found. It is here that Sindh government should intervene and inact laws to help the herders.
6. In Australia, they have wind mill pumping water in galvanised iron sheet tanks and troughs for sheep. Wind mills for power generation are not economical, at wind velocities prevailing in Sindh, but for desert area, their social benefits out weigh economic considerations .It will be a terrible mistake to plan them for power or for that matter solar power. Some NGOs have fancy for these devices .These come under aid and free, but for the same amount of aid, we can ask donors for some thing better. After all these countries are committed to give certain amount as aid, so why not to spend it usefully, rather then import goods unconomical in their own countries and under experimental stage.
7. I am told that local made wind mills did not perform well in the desert areas. This may be true, but responsibility lies on the officers approving them and costs should not exceed CI and F value of imported ones. This is what WTO and Market Economy is aiming at .It has to be executed in letter and spirit
8. It has been mentioned that Post War reconstruction plans for Sindh in 1945, included railway from Nawabshah to Jaisalmir-Ajmeer and Delhi and another line from Choreto Chachro-Nagar Parker and Ahmedabad. Still another railway line from Dadu to Kamber via foot hills of Kohistan.
9. One of purposes of these railways, besides opening the country, was to shift animals from Thar and Kohistan to safety and provide supplies to desert people during emergency. This purpose had to be kept in view after partition of India and Pakistan. We did not make any alternative plans in fifty seven years.
10.Transport of animals from desert by trucks is neither practical nor economical. Railway wagon can carry up to 50 cattle or 250 sheep and goats at time to irrigated areas, where feed is readily available. It would have been the cheapest mode of transport.
11.Some European companies were planning to raise alfalfa (lucerne) in Sindh on some 50,000-100,000 acres, harvesting and quick drying it in sun for 2-3 days and pressing it in to high density cubes to be used as animal feed. The project was given up due to political and social conditions existing in Sindh. This type of project needs to be launched for promotion of animal husbandry industry, as well to meet emergency needs of feed for desert area.
12.Besides Thar and Kohistan , we have desertification in 2.12 million acres of riverain area of Sindh, and vast coastal area out side command of Kotri Barrage measuring couple of million aces The people from these areas are migrating to cities for employment. They face identical problems as Tharis and Kohistanis do and their problems are no less than those of other two and even worse, as rains bring some relief to formers, but rains are no solution to riverain areas and cause serious problems of flooding, water logging and communications in coastal areas, in addition to malaria and other water borne diseases.
13.Government provides aid or relief to famine stricken people. This humanitarian act is necessary and must be provided. However as we are made to believe that famine conditions are bound to prevail twice in every decade, then thought should have been given it long ago to find permanent solutions. The amounts we spend on charity twice in a decade, can be directed to development of area against periodic drought
14.As a permanent solution the government created autonomous organisation SAZDA. I am not here to comment on what they did and whether were successes or failures, but I only want to say that this 3.7 billion project, did not start with socio-economic studies and much more needed geo-environmental studies. They straight away went in execution of schemes. Thus even if all schemes may be considered a success, they did leave gaps in geo-environmental as well as socio-economic studies and consequently people keep suffering. If any relief came, it was to a few, out of many hundred thousands people
15.When there are two droughts in every ten or eleven years, the need was to concentrate on the problems which recurrently happen.
16.Deserts can not be developed like the river irrigated valleys. They can only be developed by methods used in other deserts. Deserts are and were being tackled by former USSR, South Western States of USA, Western and Southern deserts in China, north African deserts first by French and now by local people with foreign assistance, Great Victoria Desert by Australians and so on. Even Peru, Chile, Argentina and South Africa have been handling their desert problems. Israel has aggressively handled desert problems by their own indigenous methods, as well as copying former USSR and U.S.A. The deserts occupy one third of the land mass of earth and lesson had to be learnt from other deserts and we still can under take this study very seriously, even if it is a some years basic work. Then alone we will be entitled to prepare schemes for execution and will in all probabilities succeed.
17.We cannot become over optimistic with desert. Deserts are living things full of fauna and flora. They will yield what potential they have and we cannot strain them beyond this. If we do, we will simply kill them. Desert exploitation has to be within limits and improving desert environments and its health is a must, as it is alive.
18. Thar Desert was not always a desert, as it was green savannah only 4,000 years back, in which man domesticated and grazed his animals. When drought came, instead of maintaining it, we put and more animals and finally started destroying fragile vegetation causing present deserts on all sides of Sindh At no cost we should promote its further deterioration by wrong planning. All our plans must fit into environments, should protect them and save desert from final death.
American British Sindhi Medical Network
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